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Abstract
Communication is fundamental to elections. This paper extends canonical
voter turnout models to include any form of communication, and character-
izes the resulting set of correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research,
high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments.
This difference arises because communication can be used to coordinate be-
havior in such a way that voters find it incentive compatible to always follow
their signals past the communication stage. The equilibria have expected
turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive
voting costs, and show intuitive comparative statics on turnout: it varies with
the relative sizes of different groups, and decreases with the cost of voting.
This research provides a general micro foundation for group-based theories of
voter mobilization, or voting driven by communication on a network.
1 Introduction
What drives voter turnout is a fundamental question in political economy. Canonical
models, which rely on voters rationally and independently deciding whether to turn out
based on how likely they are to be pivotal to the election outcomes, provide unsatisfactory
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explanations (Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985),
Myerson (2000)). In particular, these models fail to rationalize the high turnout rates
observed in very large elections. Intuitively, as the electorate grows large, the probability
that any individual voter is pivotal goes to zero, so with voting incurring a cost, very few
people should turn out. This flaw has led many scholars to seek alternative, behavioral
explanations.1
This paper re-examines these results in the presence of communication, broadly de-
fined – between candidates, media, and voters – and shows that this can support high
turnout in large elections while maintaining the assumption that voters’ incentives are
purely instrumental. The key difference is that communication allows for strategies such
that equilibrium behavior is still optimal for each individual voter, but such that voters’
turnout decisions are now correlated, rather than independent as in the standard game-
theoretic analysis. That is, communication allows us to examine correlated equilibria
(Aumann, 1974, 1987). These equilibria are behaviorally more plausible than Nash since
they model voters’ knowledge of the other voters’ equilibrium strategies as a result of
communication and learning, and so can apply to electorates with less than fully informed
voters, like the U.S. (Bartels, 1996).
As suggested above, the forms of communication allowed in the model are very gen-
eral. The only necessary condition is that the communication results in some amount of
correlation in voters’ decisions. As such, the model provides a very rich space in which
communication can be from a few senders to many receivers – as it would be with the
media or parties communicating with voters – or between a very large number of senders
and receivers. In this sense, the model can provide a micro-foundation for group-based
voter mobilization: as mobilization efforts induce correlation in decisions, they provide a
mechanism for turnout that does not rely on group-based utilities or coercion (Uhlaner
(1989), Schram and van Winden (1991), Cox (1999)). Moreover, as correlation could
be induced by any signal – even signals like weather, which would not be thought of as
having political content – the model incorporates mechanisms that would not play any
role in standard rational choice explanations.2
The intuition underlying the highest-turnout correlated equilibrium is straightfor-
ward. To see this, suppose there are two parties, A and B, who compete in an election
decided by majority rule. Citizens (potential voters) are not indifferent between the par-
ties, so there are nA citizens that support party A and nB < nA citizens that support
1See, e.g., Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), Bendor et al. (2011), Ali and Lin (2013).
2See Gomez, Hansford, and Krause (2007) who demonstrate not only that the bad weather on the
election day decreases turnout, but also that it affects Democrats and Republicans differently.
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party B. Each citizen decides to vote based only on the tradeoff between her poten-
tial effect on the election outcome and the cost of voting. A voter will only affect the
outcome when pivotal, that is, when her vote would change the election from her least
favored party winning to a tie, or from a tie to her most favored party winning. As in
standard models, in any equilibrium, the probability that a voter is pivotal, multiplied
by the benefit she gets from changing the outcome of the election, must be greater than
or equal to the cost of voting. Thus turnout is highest when the election results in a tie,
either directly or in expectation.
Without communication, citizens will make turnout decisions independently. The
largest tie would require all of minority citizens (nB citizens), and the exact same number
of majority citizens (nB out of nA citizens) to participate. In such a case, every recruited
citizen would be pivotal with the same probability, and so, as long as it is high enough,
would have incentives to turn out as required by this strategy. But the remaining nA−nB
majority citizens would deviate by also turning out, so this is not an equilibrium. In
fact, except for few very special cases, there are no equilibria where all citizens use pure
strategies.
With communication, however, turnout decisions can be correlated. The party sup-
ported by the minority of the citizens signals all of its supporters to vote. The party with
the majority support uses a more complicated communication protocol.3 In some fraction
of elections, p, the majority party creates a pivotal situation by sending a signal to vote
to nB of its supporters and no signal to the rest of majority citizens. In the remaining
fraction of elections, the majority party sends to all of its supporters a signal to vote with
probability nB
nA
, and no signal with probability 1 − nB
nA
. Therefore, each minority citizen
will be pivotal with probability p. As long as p is high enough, all minority citizens will
find it in their interest to turn out and vote. On the other hand, the majority citizens,
based on the signal from their party, will not know for sure whether or not they are in
the pivotal situation. For the value of p corresponding to the correlated equilibrium,
majority citizens will also find it in their interest to follow the signal of their party, and
to avoid the cost of voting by abstaining if they receive no signal. It is easy to see that
in this correlated equilibrium the expected turnout will be quite high: twice the size of
the minority. If the minority is large enough, voter turnout could thus be close to 100%.
The upper bound on turnout of twice the size of the minority, highlighted in the
example above, is sometimes closely approached by the actual elections. To take a
recent high profile elections, the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence gathered
3I thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the idea of this example.
3
1,617,989 votes in favor of independence.4 Internet, telephone, and face-to-face opinion
polls, averaged over the last two months before the referendum day indicated that about
42.07% of Scots supported independence, which translates into about 1,802,023 citizens.5
Assuming that polls more or less perfectly revealed the majority and minority supports,
this means that nearly 90% of minority citizens turned out, which is close to the full
minority turnout in the example. Moreover, the total turnout was 3,619,915 citizens,
which is almost exactly twice the size of the minority (up to a third decimal point).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 provides a literature
overview. Section 2 describes the basic model, which assumes complete information and
homogenous voting costs. Subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 present and discuss the main results
for this case. Subsection 2.1.3 presents efficiency analysis for the basic model. Section
3 extends the basic model to the case of heterogeneous voting costs and shows that
the main results continue to hold. Section 4 explores the effects of private information
about voting costs. Section 5 discusses how our results extend the related findings in the
existing literature. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper directly relates to two strands of the voluminous literature on formal models
of turnout. One is the pivotal voter model, in particular, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983,
1985). The other is group-based models that build upon the pivotal voter analysis,
e.g. Morton (1991). Our model combines these approaches, and so contributes to the
literatures on the turnout paradox and voter mobilization.
The turnout paradox, that is, the unsupportable rational choice prediction of turnout
rate close to zero in large elections, was first formulated by Downs (1957) in the context of
a decision theoretic voting model, which was extended later by Tullock (1967) and Riker
and Ordeshook (1968). It would be impossible to mention here all the relevant papers
that have been published on the topic since those early studies, so we have to restrict
ourselves to the most closely related works. We refer the reader to Feddersen (2004) and
Geys (2006) for very well-written recent literature surveys. See also Palfrey (2013) for
a recent survey of laboratory experiments in political economy, including experiments
testing different theories of turnout (Ibid., Section 4).
The pivotal voter model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) argues that voters’ decisions
to turn out are strategic, so the probability of being pivotal must be determined endoge-
nously in equilibrium. Under complete information and common voting cost, Palfrey and
4Source: www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results
5Source: whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-scotland-be-an-independent-country-1
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Rosenthal (1983) found several classes of high-turnout Nash equilibria. Under incomplete
information about voting costs, though, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) showed that non-
zero turnout rate in large elections is not sustainable in the (quasi-symmetric) Bayesian
Nash equilibrium: only voters with non-positive voting costs will vote in the limit as the
majority and minority groups get large. Myerson (1998, 2000) introduced a very gen-
eral approach to the analysis of large games with population uncertainty. However his
“independent actions” assumption, which results in the number of players being a Pois-
son random variable, does not allow correlation between players’ strategies. Barelli and
Duggan (2013) prove existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in games
with correlated types and interdependent payoffs. Their Example 2.4, an application of
their main purification theorem, is a more general version of the costly voting game under
incomplete information than the one we consider in Section 4. Unlike them, we study the
strategic form correlated equilibria of this game that differ from Bayesian Nash equilibria
with correlated types, and focus on characterizing the bounds on expected turnout rather
than equilibrium existence.
Although the pivotal voter model prediction about expected turnout fails under in-
complete information, the comparative static predictions are largely supported in labo-
ratory experiments: see, e.g. Levine and Palfrey (2007). More recent work falling within
this approach focused on welfare effects associated with turnout, comparison of manda-
tory and voluntary voting rules, and the effect of polls (e.g. Bo¨rgers (2004), Goeree and
Grosser (2007), Diermeier and Van Mieghem (2008), Krasa and Polborn (2009), Taylor
and Yildirim (2010)). Campbell (1999) finds that decisive minorities (i.e., those with
lower voting costs or with greater expected benefits) are more likely to win in a quasi-
symmetric equilibrium, even if their expected share in the electorate is small. His main
point of departure from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) is introducing correlation between
voter types (i.e., party preference) and voting cost. In this respect, he extends Ledyard
(1984) who assumed that types and costs are distributed independently.
Kalandrakis (2007, 2009) looks at general turnout games with complete information
and heterogeneous costs, and shows that almost all Nash equilibria of these games are
regular and robust to small amounts of incomplete information. These findings can be
compared to our results in Sections 3 and 4. Another closely related paper is Myatt
(2012), who investigates how adding aggregate uncertainty about candidates’ popularity
could be used to solve the turnout paradox. His main result can be viewed as adding
a modicum of correlation in an asymptotic approximation of the high-turnout quasi-
symmetric Nash equilibrium characterized in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) to rule out
zero equilibrium turnout rate as the electorate grows large. Similarly to those equilibria, it
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requires the common voting cost to be high enough, and predicts a tie in the equilibrium.
Myatt (2012, Proposition 2) shows that the same logic can be applied to mixed-pure
Nash equilibria, but characterizes the expected turnout only for a special case of the
candidates’ popularity density. Our results allow for correlation directly in the solution
concept.
There are other prominent approaches to modeling voter behavior that aim at solving
the turnout paradox (e.g., the ethical voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006); see
also the recent extensions by Evren (2012) and Ali and Lin (2013); or adaptive learning
models, e.g., Bendor et al. (2011); or models based on uncertainty about candidates, e.g.
Sanders (2001); or the quality of voters’ private signals, e.g. McMurray (2013)). While
these and similar models highlight a number of important aspects of voting in mass
elections, they do not explicitly consider correlations in voters’ actions. Our approach
in this paper is different: we deliberately maintain the stark rational choice setting to
show that even in this case the high turnout equilibria can be supported once correlation
among voters is accounted for.6
Unlike the pivotal voter model, where the individual voter is a central unit of anal-
ysis, group-based models operate at the level of groups of voters. An early example is
Becker (1983), who models competition among pressure groups for political influence non-
strategically as independent utility maximization by each group subject to a joint budget
constraint. Uhlaner (1989) emphasizes the role of groups in voting decisions, but does
not characterize the equilibrium of the model. Morton (1991) shows that with fixed can-
didates’ positions, positive turnout can be obtained in equilibrium with two groups, but
in the general equilibrium framework, where candidates’ positions can shift, the paradox
prevails. Schram (1991) and Schram and van Winden (1991) develop a model with two
groups and opinion leaders in each group, who produce social pressure on others to turn
out. The individual voters are modeled as consumers of social pressure. It is shown that
it is optimal for the producers of social pressure to do it, but to explain why consumers
of social pressure would find it optimal to follow the leaders a civic duty argument is
used. Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) develop a model of a pivotal leader, and structurally
estimate it using voting data for U.S. presidential elections. See Rosenstone and Hansen
(1993), Cox (1999), and references therein for an overview of empirical findings related
to party mobilization models.
Overall, group-based models get around the turnout paradox by assuming the exis-
6The effects of communication on turnout may be also indirect. For example, Ortoleva and Snow-
berg (2015) find, inter alia, that voter overconfidence, even conditional on ideology, increases turnout.
Communication among voters might be a possible way that overconfidence builds up in the first place.
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tence of a small number of group leaders who control voter mobilization decisions by
allocating resources or by means of social pressure. The exogenous mapping from mo-
bilization efforts to voter turnout is assumed. The micro foundation for the control
mechanism as well as the origins of group leaders are not usually modeled. In our case,
both of these mechanisms arise naturally as coordination mechanisms in the form of pre-
play communication among voters. Communication in turn induces correlation among
the voters’ strategies that can lead to surprisingly high turnout.
There is growing field and laboratory experimental evidence that communication
among voters, and between political activists and voters, taken in a wide variety of forms
(e.g., public opinion polls, get-out-the-vote campaigns, and so forth) critically influences
turnout rates. A book-length treatment of field experiments studying effects of get-
out-the-vote campaigns on turnout is Gerber and Green (2008), and one of influential
earlier papers is Gerber and Green (2000). Gerber et al (2011) show that effects of TV
advertising may be strong but short-lived. See also Lassen (2005) on a related topic of
voter information affecting turnout.7 Recently, DellaVigna et al (2014) emphasize the
social pressure aspect of turnout, also studied in Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008),
while Barber and Imai (2014) show that even the neighborhood composition itself may
matter for turnout. A recent work by Sinclair (2012) emphasizes the role of networks in
political behavior, arguing that networks not only provide information, but also directly
influence citizens’ actions. See also Rolfe (2012). This approach is complementary to
our work: while we do not explicitly model social connections among voters in this
paper, one can easily imagine how such network links could serve as channels of pre-play
communication.
Laboratory experiments include, e.g., Grosser and Schram (2006), who study the
effects of communication in the form of neighborhood information exchange between an
early voter (sender) and a late voter (receiver) from the same neighborhood. Grosser and
Schram (2010), and Agranov et al. (2013) study the effects of polls on turnout and welfare.
In particular, Agranov et al. (2013) show that while polls do not have negative welfare
effects, they overestimate voter turnout. The authors also find evidence for voting with
the winner, where a voter is more likely to turn out if she thinks her preferred candidate
is more likely to win.
7McMurray (2012) notes that models that avoid the turnout paradox by introducing consumption
benefits, at the same time nullify the empirical relation between voter information and turnout.
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2 The Model
The set of voters is denoted N , with |N | = n ≥ 3. There are two candidates, A and
B. The decision making rule is simple majority with ties broken randomly. Each player
i ∈ N has type8 ti ∈ {A,B} representing her political preference: if ti = A then i prefers
candidate A to candidate B, if ti = B then the preference is reversed. Denote by NA,
with |NA| = nA, the group of voters who prefer candidate A, and NB, with |NB| = nB,
the group preferring candidate B. Throughout the paper we assume that nA > nB,
and will refer to NA and NB as majority and minority, respectively. Thus in the usual
parlance, candidate A is the favorite, while candidate B is the underdog.
Each voter has two pure actions: to vote for the preferred candidate (action 1) or
abstain (action 0).9 Thus i’s action space is Si = {0, 1}. The set of voting profiles is
S = S1×· · ·×Sn, i.e. S = {(si)i∈N |si ∈ {0, 1}}. Voting is costly, and utility of voting net
of voting cost is normalized to 1 if the preferred candidate wins, 1/2, if there is a tie, and
0 otherwise. Instead of explicitly modelling candidates as players of this game, we use
a representation with a centralized mediator giving out recommendations to voters, who
either maximizes or minimizes total expected turnout. As will be clear from Proposition
1, our main result, this does not matter for the empirically relevant case of the large
minority with nB >
1
2
nA. In Pogorelskiy (2015) we analyze the general case where this
representation matters.
2.1 Complete Information and Homogenous Voting Costs
In this section we assume that NA and NB are commonly known. Furthermore, assume
that the participation cost is the same for all voters and fixed at c ∈ (0, 1/2).10 In a
more general case with heterogeneous costs, considered in Section 3, we discuss how one
could allow some voters, e.g., those who view voting as a social duty, to have negative
voting costs. In the case of a negative common cost, however, letting c < 0 results in a
trivial equilibrium with everybody voting, so for the rest of this section we only consider
non-negative values of c.
Definition 1. A correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution11 µ ∈ ∆(S) such that
8We do not explicitly include i’s private voting cost in her type for convenience reasons and always
refer to i’s voting costs separately.
9Voting for a less preferred candidate is always dominated, and can be dispensed with.
10If c ≥ 12 (c ≤ 0), the problem is trivial, with abstaining (voting) being everyone’s dominant strategy.
11Aumann (1987) calls this object a correlated equilibrium distribution; this distinction is immaterial.
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for all i ∈ N , for all si ∈ {0, 1}, and all s′i ∈ {0, 1}∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(si, s−i) (Ui(si, s−i)− Ui(s′i, s−i)) ≥ 0 (1)
where Ui(si, s−i) is the utility of voter i at a strategy profile (si, s−i).
To get some intuition for this definition, assume for a moment that all joint strategy
profiles have a strictly positive probability, and divide both sides of (1) by Prob(si) =∑
s−i∈S−i µ(si, s−i). Since Prob(s−i|si) = µ(si, s−i)/Prob(si), correlated equilibrium can
be interpreted as a probability distribution over joint strategy profiles where at every
profile player i’s choice is a weak best response under the posterior distribution condi-
tional on that choice. Conditioning is used here to obtain the others’ posteriors about
player i’s choice, which must be correct in equilibrium. Notice also that Nash equilib-
rium is a special case of correlated equilibrium, where µ is the product of n independent
probability distributions, each one over the corresponding player’s action space. Thus
Nash equilibrium rules out any correlation between players’ actions.
Call (1) voter i’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Since each player has only
two (pure) strategies, we only need to consider those inequalities in (1) where s′i 6= si;
thus for each of n players we will only need two inequalities making it 2n inequalities in
total (plus the feasibility constraints on µ). Denote D(NA, NB, c) the set of solutions to
such a system. Formally,
D(NA, NB, c) = {µ ∈ ∆(S)| for all i ∈ N, (1) holds} (2)
D(NA, NB, c) is a convex compact set, and since any Nash equilibrium is a correlated
equilibrium, D(NA, NB, c) is also non-empty. It will be convenient to explicitly rewrite
(2) as the set of distributions µ ∈ ∆(S) such that ∀i ∈ N the following two inequalities
hold ∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(0, s−i) (Ui(0, s−i)− Ui(1, s−i)) ≥ 0 (3)∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(1, s−i) (Ui(1, s−i)− Ui(0, s−i)) ≥ 0 (4)
Substituting the expression for the voter’s utility with normalized benefit minus voting
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cost, conditions (3)-(4) reduce to
c
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(0, s−i) +
(
c− 1
2
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(0, s−i) ≥ 0 (5)
−c
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(1, s−i) +
(
1
2
− c
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(1, s−i) ≥ 0 (6)
where for any i ∈ Nj, j ∈ {A,B}
V iP =
(sk)k∈N\{i}| ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk =
∑
k∈N−j
sk or
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk =
∑
k∈N−j
sk − 1
 (7)
V iD =
(sk)k∈N\{i}| ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk >
∑
k∈N−j
sk or
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk <
∑
k∈N−j
sk − 1
 (8)
are the sets of profiles where player i is pivotal, and not pivotal, respectively. In the
latter case, we call player i a dummy, hence the subscript.
Conditions (5)-(6) have a simple interpretation. They say that in any correlated
equilibrium, unlike in the Nash equilibrium, for each player there are two best response
conditions: one, (6), is conditional on voting, and the other, (5), conditional on abstain-
ing. These conditions are equivalent to the following two restrictions:
c ≥ 1
2
Prob(i is pivotal | i abstains)
c ≤ 1
2
Prob(i is pivotal | i votes)
Thus, a correlated equilibrium in this game is given by a probability distribution over
joint voting profiles where at every profile each player finds it incentive compatible to
follow her prescribed choice conditional on this profile realization.
Out of many possible correlated equilibria, we focus on the boundaries of the set: we
study the equilibria that maximize (max-turnout) and minimize (min-turnout) expected
turnout. Formally, a max-turnout equilibrium solves the following linear programming
problem:
maximize f(µ) =
∑
s∈S
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(9)
s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)
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for 0 < c < 1/2. Correspondingly, a min-turnout equilibrium solves
minimize f(µ) s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) (10)
A potential difficulty in deriving the analytical solution to these problems lies in the 2n
incentive compatibility constraints (5)-(6) that must be simultaneously satisfied. Fortu-
nately, it is possible to overcome this problem. The simplification comes from the obser-
vation that for all correlated equilibria that maximize or minimize turnout, there exists
a “group-symmetric” probability distribution that delivers the same expected turnout.
Let µ(zi, a, b) denote the probability of any joint profile where player i plays strategy
zi, and, among the other n−1 players, a players turn out in group NA and b players turn
out in group NB. Define a set of group-symmetric probability distributions as follows.
M = {µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)|
∀i ∈ NA,∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1},∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, ∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)}
In words, the distributions inM place the same probability on all such profiles that have
the same number of players turning out from either side, and differ only by the identity
of those who turn out and those who abstain. Thus the identity of the voter does not
matter as long as the total number of this voter’s group votes is the same, given the fixed
number of votes on the other side.
Lemma 1. For any distribution µ∗ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) that solves problem (9) or (10),
there exists an equivalent group-symmetric probability distribution σ∗ that also delivers a
solution to the same problem. Formally, f(σ∗) = f(µ∗) and σ∗ ∈M.
Proof. See A.1.
Lemma 1 allows a substantial simplification of the problem without any loss of gener-
ality, reducing 2n inequalities down to just four: two for a member of group NA and two
more for a member of group NB; and reducing the number of variables (unknown profile
probabilities) from the original 2n profiles down to (nA+1)(nB+1), which is the maximal
number of profiles with different probabilities under group-symmetric distributions.
Before describing the general characterization of solutions to (9) and (10), we walk
through the simplest possible example with 3 voters, which serves to illustrate both
Lemma 1 and the main results of the paper.
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Example 1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3}. Let NA = {1, 2} and NB = {3}. There are eight
possible voting profiles: from (0, 0, 0) with no one voting to (1, 1, 1) with full turnout.
Denote (si, sj, sk) a strategy profile where i, j ∈ NA and k ∈ NB. Then for each i ∈ NA,
Ui(si, s−i) =

1− sic if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}
1
2
− sic if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}
0 if (si, sj, sk) = (0, 0, 1)
Similarly, for k ∈ NB,
Uk(sk, s−k) =

1− c if (si, sj, sk) = (0, 0, 1)
1
2
− skc if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}
−skc if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}
Denote µsisjsk = µ(si, sj, sk) to simplify notation. Now conditions (5)-(6) reduce to
the following system of linear inequalities, where we also add the standard probability
requirements:
cµ010 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ001 + µ011) ≥ 0 (11)
−cµ110 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ100 + µ101 + µ111) ≥ 0 (12)
cµ100 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ001 + µ101) ≥ 0 (13)
−cµ110 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ010 + µ011 + µ111) ≥ 0 (14)
cµ110 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ010 + µ100) ≥ 0 (15)
−cµ111 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ001 + µ011 + µ101) ≥ 0 (16)
∀s ∈ {0, 1}3 µs ≥ 0 (17)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1 (18)
The solutions have the following properties.12 In any correlated equilibrium the con-
12Recall that we restricted c to lie in (0,0.5). We can now provide the rationale behind this assumption.
If c > 0.5, the unique correlated equilibrium has µ000 = 1, i.e., no one votes. This follows because once
c > 12 , inequalities (12), (14), and (16) can only hold if µ100 = µ101 = µ110 = µ111 = 0, µ010 = µ011 = 0,
and µ001 = 0, which implies µ000 = 1. If c = 0.5, any probability distribution with µ110 = 0 and
µ111 = 0 is a correlated equilibrium: inequalities (12), (14), and (16) can only hold if µ110 = µ111 = 0,
while all remaining inequalities are trivially satisfied. If c = 0, then any probability distribution with
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straints can be rewritten as
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ010 + µ100) ≤ µ110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ111 + min {µ100 + µ101, µ010 + µ011}) (19)
µ010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ001 + µ011) (20)
µ100 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ001 + µ101) (21)
µ111 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + µ011 + µ101) (22)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1 (23)
µ000, µ001, µ010, µ011, µ100, µ101, µ111 ∈ [0, 1), µ110 ∈ (0, 1) (24)
This system has many solutions, and µ000 < 1 implies that all have positive expected
turnout. Notice that in (20)-(22) the probabilities of profiles with more votes are bounded
from above by the probabilities of profiles with less votes, while in (19) it is the other
way round. These relations are important for the extreme correlated equilibria, because
they determine the constraints that bind at an optimum.
We next identify the max-turnout equilibria that solve the following linear program:
maximize
∑
s∈{0,1}3
(si + sj + sk)µsisjsk s.t. µ ∈ D(2, 1, c) (25)
A solution to (25) always exists since D(2, 1, c) 6= ∅. We will denote such a solution
µ∗. Since the objective function does not depend on µ000 ≥ 0, (23) implies that µ∗000 = 0.
Using this fact and (23), we can rewrite the objective in (25) as∑
s∈{0,1}3
(si + sj + sk)µsisjsk = 1 + (µ011 + µ101 + µ110) + 2µ111 (26)
We next show that at µ∗ the value of the objective function is 2 for any 0 < c < 0.5.
Lemma 1 implies that without loss of generality we can let µ010 = µ100 and µ011 = µ101.
µ000 = µ001 = µ011 = µ101 = µ010 = µ100 = 0 is a correlated equilibrium; thus it is any mixture between
µ111 and µ110.
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Hence (20) and (21) reduce to the same constraint, and (19)-(23) imply13
µ010 ≤ µ111 + µ011
µ010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + µ011)
µ111 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + 2µ011)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1
where the first inequality follows from (19) with µ∗000 = 0. This implies
µ111 ≤ 2µ010 −
1
2
− c
c
µ001
Then in (26) the right hand side is at most 1 + (µ011 +µ101 +µ110 +µ010 +µ100 +µ111)−
1
2
−c
c
µ001 = 2− µ0012c . Now we can see that to achieve the upper bound of two, it is necessary
to put µ∗001 = 0. Thus we let µ
∗
000 = µ
∗
001 = 0, and put µ
∗
111 = 2µ
∗
010. Then constraints
(19)-(23) reduce to
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ µ∗110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(3µ∗010 + µ
∗
011) (27)
µ∗010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
µ∗011 (28)
2µ∗010 ≤
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗011 (29)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µ∗s = 1 (30)
From the last two inequalities it follows that µ∗011 = µ
∗
101 =
c
1
2
−cµ
∗
010. Re-arranging,
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ µ∗110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
3 +
c
1
2 − c
)
µ∗010 (31)
µ∗011 =
c
1
2 − c
µ∗010 (32)
2µ∗011 + µ
∗
110 + 4µ
∗
010 = 1 (33)
Replacing µ∗110 = 1 − 1−c1/2−c2µ∗010 from (33) and re-arranging, we obtain the following
13For the sake of brevity, we omit the non-negativity constraints on µ.
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system, which, if holds, delivers the value of two to the objective function:
µ∗000 = µ
∗
001 = 0
µ∗111 = 2µ
∗
010
µ∗011 =
c
1
2 − c
µ∗010
µ∗110 = 1− 2
1− c
1
2 − c
µ∗010
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ 1− 2
1− c
1
2 − c
µ∗010 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
3 +
c
1
2 − c
)
µ∗010
This system has at least one solution for all c ∈ (0, 0.5). In particular, we can put
µ∗000 = µ
∗
001 = 0
µ∗010 = µ
∗
100 = c(1− 2c)
µ∗111 = 2c(1− 2c)
µ∗011 = µ
∗
101 = 2c
2
µ∗110 = 4c
2 − 4c+ 1
One can verify that for this distribution, all original constraints hold, and the value of
the objective function is two. Hence for any cost 0 < c < 0.5, we can find a correlated
equilibrium with expected turnout being exactly two out of three voters, i.e. twice the
size of the minority. We will see shortly that this is a general property of the max-turnout
correlated equilibria.
2.1.1 Max-turnout equilibria
Let us now turn to the general case. Recall that we want to solve the following problem
for 0 < c < 1/2:
maximize f(µ) =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(34)
s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)
Let f ∗ ≡ f(µ∗) be the value of the objective at the optimum in (34). Our first main
result is the analytic solution to the max-turnout problem for all costs in the specified
range.
Proposition 1. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5, nA, nB ≥ 1, and nA > nB. Then the following14
14In terms of notation, dxe stands for the smallest integer not less than x.
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holds:
(i) if nB ≥ d12nAe, then f ∗ = 2nB;
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
f ∗ = 2nB +
(nA − 2nB) (1− 2c)
1 + 2c
(
nA(nA−1)
nA+nB(nA−1) − 1
) = 2nB + φ(c),
where φ(c) ∈ (0, nA − 2nB) and is decreasing in c. Alternatively, f ∗ can be expressed as
f ∗ = nA × 2cnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c) = nA × ξ(c)
where ξ(c) is decreasing in c, and
a) ξ(c) ∈ (0, 1) for all 0 < c < 1
2
;
b) ξ(c)→ 2nB
nA
as c→ 1
2
, so f ∗ → 2nB;
c) ξ(c)→ 1 as c→ 0, so f ∗ → nA.
Remark 1. The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.2. Lemma 1 is fundamental in
proving this result, allowing to establish the optimum and characterize the max-turnout
equilibrium support under a group-symmetric distribution (see Corollary 1 below). The
intuition for the result is as follows. To maximize turnout, the largest probability mass
must be placed on the voting profile where everyone votes. However, since nA > nB,
the voting players from NB are not pivotal at this profile, so for those players constraint
(6) binds at the optimum. This implies that constraint (5) for abstaining players in NA
binds at the optimum, because from (6) for players in NB binding, the probability of the
largest profile can be expressed via the probabilities of profiles where the voting players
from NB are pivotal, and those are precisely the profiles where abstaining players from
NA are pivotal. The key difference between cases (i) and (ii) only concerns the behavior
of constraint (5) for players in NB and constraint (6) for players in NA. Using these
binding constraints and the total probability constraint allows us to get a constructive
characterization of the optimum.
Proposition 1 shows that all max-turnout correlated equilibria exhibit a substantial
turnout of at least 2nB for all common costs in the range where neither voting nor ab-
stention is a dominant strategy, and for groups of different sizes. Max-turnout equilibria
have a very natural interpretation: when the group sizes are so different that the minor-
ity have a priori low chances of winning even when the majority group votes at random
(i.e., nB < d12nAe), the cost of voting matters and the maximal expected turnout is de-
creasing in cost. When the group size difference is not that large, the maximal expected
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turnout equals twice the size of the minority and does not depend on cost, as if voting
was costless.
In addition to the maximal expected turnout, we also characterize the support of
the optimal group-symmetric distributions. Using Lemma 1, we can, without loss of
generality, describe the profiles in the support as (a, b) where a (b) is the total number
of voters from NA (NB, respectively) who turn out at this profile.
Corollary 1. A correlated equilibrium with maximal expected turnout can be implemented
via a group-symmetric distribution with the following support S˜ ⊂ S:
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
S˜ =
{
(a, nB) ∈ Z2|a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} ∪ {nB, . . . , nA}
}
;
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
S˜ =
{
(a+ 1, a) ∈ Z2|a ∈ {0, . . . , nB}
} ∪ {(nB, nB)} ∪ {(nA, 0)}
Proof. See A.2.
In words, when nB > d12nAe, the equilibrium support consists of everyone in the
minority voting except at the profile (nB − 1, nB), and the majority mixing between all
profiles. When nB < d12nAe, the support consists only of the profiles where the minority
has exactly one vote less than the majority, the largest tied profile, and a single extreme
profile with the full turnout by the majority and full abstention by the minority, (nA, 0).
Group-symmetric distributions allow to characterize the correlated equilibria with
maximal expected turnout without loss of generality, but this characterization is not
unique: it is possible that an asymmetric probability distribution also delivers a solu-
tion to the max-turnout problem. However, the group-symmetric distribution has an
attractive implementation property: all voters in a group are treated equally. Namely,
one way to think about a group-symmetric correlated equilibrium is to imagine a medi-
ator selecting a profile with a given total number of votes on each side according to the
group-symmetric equilibrium distribution, µ∗, and then randomly recruiting the required
number of voters on each side according to the selected profile, giving a recommenda-
tion to vote to those selected, and a recommendation to abstain to the rest. Thus the
group-symmetric max-turnout equilibria involve interim randomization on the part of
the mediator.
Remark 2. Based on the profiles that have positive probability in equilibrium, it is
instructive to compare the correlated equilibria identified in case (i) with the mixed-pure
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Nash equilibria of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983): indeed, according to Corollary 1, just
like in those equilibria, voters in NB should vote for sure, and voters in NA should mix.
The similarity ends here, however. First, the max turnout mixed-pure Nash equilibria
have expected turnout increasing in the cost. Second, in the mixed-pure equilibria of
Palfrey and Rosenthal, all voters of the mixing group vote with the same probability
q ∈ (0, 1). Hence the probability of a profile (a, nB) is
(
nA
a
)
qa(1−q)nA−a. In the correlated
equilibria from case (i), the probability of the same profile is
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB , where µ delivers
a maximum to the objective in (34). For the two probability distributions to coincide, it
requires µa,nB = q
a(1−q)nA−a for all a ∈ [0, nA]. But since
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 2c (see Corollary
2 below) and µnB−1,nB = 0, there is no q ∈ (0, 1) that would satisfy this condition.
Remark 3. If one restricts the equilibrium support in case (i) to the following three
profiles: full turnout, largest tie, and any single profile of the form (a, nB) for a ∈
{0, . . . , nB − 2}, the group-symmetric max-turnout equilibrium is unique. This follows
from equations (70) and (72) in A.2. Our example in the introduction is a special case
of this restricted equilibrium support with a = 0.
In view of Corollary 1, we can compute the probability that the election results in a tie,
denoted pinB ,nB , since (nB, nB) is the only tied profile in the support of the equilibrium
distribution. It is also interesting to see how the probability of the tie changes with
the size of the electorate. There are several ways to model the limiting case when the
electorate grows large. We present here the results for the simplest case, which is keeping
the ratio nB
nA
= α fixed at some α ∈ (0, 1] as nB, nA →∞.
Corollary 2. (i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
pinB ,nB = 2c
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pinB ,nB =
2c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
(iii) for any fixed c, as nA, nB → ∞ with nBnA = α ∈ (0, 1), for α ∈ (0, 0.5) we have
pinB ,nB → 2c1+α( 12c−1) , and for α ∈ (0.5, 1), pinB ,nB → 2c.
Proof. See equations (71) and (93) in A.2.
Corollary 2 shows that the probability of the tied outcome only depends on the cost
and the relative size of the competing groups, and is increasing in the cost. There is
18
one caveat: the tie probability is derived under the assumption of a group-symmetric
probability distribution. For an asymmetric probability distribution that also delivers
a solution to the max-turnout problem, Corollary 2 holds as long as the equilibrium
support stays the same.
Another important proprety concerns the probability that the majority wins. Given
Corollaries 1 and 2, it is not surprising that there are again two cases for the max-turnout
equilibria:
Corollary 3. The probability the majority wins in a correlated equilibrium with maximal
expected turnout, pim, is restricted as follows.
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
1− c ≥ pim > 1
2
For the special case in Remark 3,
pim =
nB
nA
+ c
(
1− 2nB
nA
)
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pim = 1− c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
Proof. See A.3.
Corollary 3 shows that the probability that majority wins is decreasing in the cost
for a small minority (case (ii)). As c → 0.5, pim → 0.5 from above. Furthermore, for
all costs in (0, 0.5) the majority wins with probability at least 0.5. In case (i), when
nB ≥ dnA+12 e, the upper bound on this probability is decreasing in the cost, but the
situation is a bit more complicated, since pim is non-monotone in the cost for a fixed pair
of groups sizes nA and nB. The reason is the non-monotone behavior of the binomial
coefficients as well as the sensitivity of the linear program to the changes in the constraint
coefficients. The total probability mass fluctuates along the profiles of the form (a, nB)
for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB−2}∪{nB, . . . , nA} depending on the cost, and so does the probability
of the majority winning.
Our next proposition shows that as the size of the electorate grows large, the max-
turnout correlated equilibria remain divided into the same two categories: the cost-
independent case with the maximal expected turnout being twice the size of the minority,
and the cost-dependent case, where the maximal expected turnout includes an additional
term.
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Proposition 2. Fix c ∈ (0, 0.5) and let nA, nB →∞ with nBnA = α ∈ (0, 1].
(i) If α ≥ 0.5, then
lim
nA,nB→∞
f ∗
n
=
2α
1 + α
(ii) If α < 0.5, then
lim
nA,nB→∞
f ∗
n
=
2α
1 + α
+
(1− 2α)(1− 2c)
(1 + α)(1− 2c (1− 1
α
)
)
Proof. See A.4.
2.1.2 Min-turnout equilibria
Concluding the section on the basic model, let us briefly address the lower bound on the
expected turnout. This case is different in that now we are looking for a solution that
minimizes the linear objective function subject to the same constraints (5)-(6).
Denote the minimal expected turnout in this problem by
f∗ ≡ f(µ∗) = min
µ∈D(NA,NB ,c)
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(35)
Proposition 3. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5, and nA, nB ≥ 1. Then f∗ = 2 − ψ(c), where
ψ(c) ∈ (0, 2).
Proof. See A.5.
As Proposition 3 shows, the lower turnout bound is not very interesting. For all
cases, the minimal expected turnout is between 0 and 2, depending on the cost, and the
exact formula for ψ(c) is complicated, since, unlike the maximum case, the equilibrium
distribution support also depends on the cost, as shown in the Appendix. On the other
hand, the result is intuitive: the minimum turnout case is total cost-minimizing, so
to remove the individual incentives to turn out it is sufficient to have the equilibrium
distribution place all the probability mass onto the uncontested profiles where either side
wins for sure. Such profiles need no more than two agents voting.15
15There is an exception to this rule when the voting cost is approaching zero, but even if profiles with
total turnout larger than 2 have positive probabilities in equilibrium, their effect on the objective is
completely compensated by the profiles with turnout between 0 and 2. See A.5 for details.
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2.1.3 Correlated Equilibria and Efficiency
In this section we rely on the results we have obtained in the basic model to draw some
general implications about the effects of correlated strategies on welfare.
Firstly, we note that since the set of expected correlated equilibrium payoffs is convex,
there is always an equilibrium with the total expected turnout between the minimum and
the maximum.
Proposition 4. For any 0 < c < 0.5 and t ∈ [f∗(c), f ∗(c)], there exists a correlated
equilibrium with the total expected turnout equal to t.
Proof. See A.6.
Next, we ask which correlated equilibria are socially optimal. That is, we are looking
for equilibria that maximize expected social welfare, understood as a sum of all individ-
uals’ expected utilities. Given a correlated equilibrium µ, after some simple algebra, the
expected welfare can be formally written as follows.
W (µ) = (nA − nB) Pr(Majority wins) + nB − cT (µ) (36)
where T (µ) is the total expected turnout under µ. The expression in (36) nicely demon-
strates the relation between total expected turnout and welfare: increasing total turnout
reduces welfare if the probability that majority wins is kept constant, but it may increase
welfare if the increased turnout leads to a higher probability that majority wins.
Given our results on max turnout equilibria in Section 2.1.1, we can now establish
some welfare properties of such equilibria.
Proposition 5. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5 and nA > nB. Denote W
∗ the expected welfare at
a max turnout equilibrium.
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then W ∗ = (nA − nB) Pr(Majority wins) + nB(1 − 2c); and
nA+nB
2
− 2cnB < W ∗ ≤ nA − c(nA + nB);
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
W ∗ = nA(1− c)
(
1 +
2cnB(nA − 1)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
)
(iii) In both cases, W ∗ is decreasing in the voting cost
Correlated equilibria that maximize total welfare have lower expected turnout than
the max-turnout equilibria. A welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium would require
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the probability that majority wins as large as possible (ideally, equal to 1) and turnout as
low as possible (ideally, 0). In this case the maximum welfare equals nA. However, there
is a tradeoff between the probability majority wins and the expected turnout: majority
cannot win for sure in any correlated equilibrium.
Lemma 2. For any 0 < c < 1
2
, there does not exist a correlated equilibrium with majority
winning for sure.
Proof. See A.7.
Remark 4. It is interesting to note that if voting costs are different in different groups, it
is possible to have a correlated equilibrium with majority winning for sure. In particular,
if there are two group costs, cA and cB, then for cA < cB both IC constraints for voters
in NA and non-voters in NB can be satisfied. The welfare-maximizing equilibria in such
case have the probability majority wins equal to one, and all probability mass on the
profiles with one and two voters from NA and zero voters from NB.
When looking for a welfare-maximizing correlated equilibrium, Lemma 2 implies that
the probability majority wins enters (36) non-trivially and must be traded off with the
total expected turnout. Similarly to Lemma 1, there is no loss of generality involved
from considering only group-symmetric probability distributions. We can now establish
the equilibrium support for welfare-maximizing equilibria, and characterize the optimum.
Formally, the problem is now
maximize W (µ) s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) (37)
Proposition 6. Assume nA > 2.
i) There is a unique cutoff cost c∗ such that for any 0 < c < c∗ the maximal expected
welfare implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
W (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
[
c− nA+nB+2nB( 12−c)
2
− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB
2c
+ 1
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (a + 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (nB, nB),
and (2, 0).
ii) for c > c∗ such that Condition A (see below) holds, the maximal expected welfare
implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
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W˜ (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (a + 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (0, 1), and
(2, 0).
iii) for c > c∗ such that Condition A does not hold, the maximal expected welfare
implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
W¯ (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
(12 − c) [nB(nB − nA)− c(nB − 1)]
nB −
(
c+ 12
)
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (0, 1), (1, 0), and (2, 0).
Proof. See A.8
Remark 5. The unique cutoff cost c∗ is determined by equation (113) in the proof.
Condition A in the statement of Proposition 6 is the following cubic inequality in the
voting cost:
c3
(
nA +
nB − 5
2
)
+
c2
2
((nA − nB)(nB − 1) + 3− nB)
− c
4
(
nB + 1
2
+ (nA − nB)(2nB + 1)
)
+
(nA − nB)(nB + 1)
8
> 0
This inequality is equivalent to having W˜ (µ∗, c) > W¯ (µ∗, c).
Proposition 6 characterizes welfare-optimal equilibria and shows that those are gener-
ally different from either min- or max-turnout equilibria, although the expected turnout
in welfare-maximizing case is close to the minimal expected turnout.
3 Complete Information and Heterogeneous Voting
Costs
We have assumed so far that the cost of voting is common for all players. This assumption
may seem too strong, so in this section we are going to relax it and see if the main results
continue to hold.
Assume that each voter i ∈ N has a voting cost ci ∈ (0, 0.5) and the costs are
commonly known. In this cost range, no voter has a dominant strategy to always vote
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or always abstain. The correlated equilibrium conditions (5)-(6) now take the following
form: ∀i ∈ N ,
ci
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(0, s−i) +
(
ci − 1
2
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(0, s−i) ≥ 0 (38)
−ci
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(1, s−i) +
(
1
2
− ci
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(1, s−i) ≥ 0 (39)
where, as before, V iP (V
i
D) is the set of voting profiles where player i is a pivotal(dummy,
respectively). Denote D(NA, NB, (ci)i∈N) the set of probability distributions over ∆(S)
that satisfy (38)-(39).
With heterogeneous costs, the group-symmetric distribution construction (see Lemma
1), may entail some loss of generality. Since voting costs are different, the expected
turnout can be increased, compared to the group-symmetric case, if the probability dis-
tribution over profiles is adjusted so that each profile probability takes into account not
only the total number of those players voting at this profile, but also their voting costs.
E.g., profiles where players with higher costs are voting might be optimally assigned
smaller probability than profiles with the same total turnout, but where players with
lower costs are voting.16
Without loss of generality, let us order all players in group NA (NB, respectively)
by their voting costs from low to high. Denote cA, cB the lowest costs in the respective
groups. Similarly, denote c¯A, c¯B the highest costs. A joint cost profile c[cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B ] is any
cost assignment (ci)i∈N to the players in N such that ∀i ∈ Nj, j ∈ {A,B}, cj ≤ ci ≤ c¯j.
Denote the maximal expected turnout in the turnout problem with heterogeneous costs
by
h∗ ≡ f(µ∗) = max
µ∈D(NA,NB ,(ci)i∈N )
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(40)
In the present version of the paper, we restrict our analysis to the case of symmetric
distributions and demonstrate that our results under homogenous costs can be replicated
as a special case. The main goal of this exercise is to show that the maximal expected
turnout remains at high levels under heterogeneous costs, even if the set of admissible
probability distributions is restricted to be symmetric.
16Nevertheless, there is an important special case with two common group costs, cA and cB , where
one can prove an analogue of Lemma 1. We do not analyze it here.
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3.1 Symmetric distributions
In this subsection, we require the probability distributions to be group-symmetric. Anal-
ogously to Lemma 1, define
MH := {µ ∈ D(NA, NB, (ci)i∈N)|
∀i ∈ NA,∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB},∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, ∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)}
In words, MH is the set of group-symmetric probability distributions over joint profiles
which are also correlated equilibria for complete information and heterogeneous costs.
Denote the maximal expected turnout in the turnout problem with heterogeneous costs
and group-symmetric distributions by
h˜∗ := max
µ∈MH
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(41)
Clearly, h∗ ≥ h˜∗. We will now show that an analogue of Proposition 1 holds under
the condition cA = c¯B.
Proposition 7. Suppose 0 < ci < 0.5 for all i ∈ N . Require µ ∈MH . Then the following
expressions for h˜∗ provide the optimal value to the objective in the max turnout problem
with heterogeneous costs and group-symmetric distributions if and only if cA = c¯B = c
and
(i) nB > d12nAe, with h˜∗ = 2nB;
(ii) nB < d12nAe, with
h˜∗ = nA × 2c¯AnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c¯A[nA − nB](nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c, c¯A)
where ξ(c, c¯A) is decreasing in both c and c¯A, and
a) ξ(c, c¯A) ∈ (0, 1) for all 0 < c ≤ c¯A < 12 ;
b) ξ(c, ·)→ 2nB
nA
as c→ 1
2
, so h˜∗ → 2nB;
c) ξ(·, c¯A)→ 1 as c¯A → 0, so h˜∗ → nA.
Furthermore, 2nB < h˜
∗ < nA.
Proof. See A.9.
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Proposition 7 is our second main result. It shows that the maximal expected turnout
under correlated equilibria and group-symmetric distributions behaves similarly to the
case of a single voting cost, and essentially depends on two things: the relative sizes of
the groups and the bounds of the support of the cost distribution. The intuition for
the result is similar to Proposition 1. Maximizing turnout implies that constraint (39)
for players in NB binds at the optimum. This in turn implies that constraint (38) for
players in NA binds at the optimum. Now the binding constraint (39) for players in NB
crucially depends on c¯B, because once it holds for the voters with the highest costs in
group NB, it automatically holds for voters in NB with lower costs. On the other hand,
the binding constraint (38) for players in NA crucially depends on cA, because once it
holds for the voters with the lowest costs in group NA, it automatically holds for voters
in NA with higher costs. The effects of the two constraints cancel each other out if and
only if cA = c¯B. Once this condition holds, the key difference between cases (i) and (ii)
under symmetric distributions only concerns the behavior of constraint (38) for players
in NB and constraint (39) for players in NA, just like in Proposition 1.
In the proof of Proposition 7 we show that when cA = c¯B, the equilibrium distribution
support is the same as in Proposition 1, so Corollary 1 holds without change. For the
sake of completeness let us also provide here the expressions for the probability of the
largest tie, pinB ,nB . The only change from Corollary 2 concerns the case of small minority.
Corollary 4. Suppose nA > nB ≥ 1, 0 < ci < 0.5 for all i ∈ N , and cA = c¯B = c.
Assuming symmetric distributions,
(i) if nB > d12nAe then
pinB ,nB = 2c
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pinB ,nB =
2
1
c
[
1 + 1
2c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1
c¯A(nA−1)
Proof. See equations (130) and (151) in the proof of Proposition 7 in A.9.
Notice that if c = c¯A, the expression for case (ii) coincides with its analogue in
Corollary 2.
What happens when cA 6= c¯B? In A.9 we show that if c¯B < cA, then the maximal
expected turnout exceeds the value of h˜∗ for both cases of Proposition 7 and for any
admissible combination of the other cost thresholds. At first sight this might look coun-
terintuitive: c¯B < cA implies that the majority group find it costlier to vote than the
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minority group, so they should vote less. However, the higher voting cost of the majority
group also implies that it will be easier to satisfy their IC constraints for abstention, as
well as the minority group IC constraints for voting. Thus in the group-symmetric max
turnout correlated equilibrium, the competitive profiles with higher total turnout will be
assigned higher probabilities, producing higher expected turnout. As cB → 12 , c¯B → cA,
so the maximal expected turnout converges to h˜∗ from above. Similarly, when c¯B > cA,
the maximal expected turnout is lower than the value of h˜∗ for both cases of Proposition
7. Nevertheless, as min{cA, cB} → 12 , cA → c¯B, so the maximal expected turnout con-
verges to h˜∗ from below. Therefore, the result of Proposition 7 is, in a sense, a limiting
case when the lowest cost threshold increases towards 1
2
and symmetric distributions are
assumed.
One can also imagine the case where some voters have costs greater than 1
2
or less
than 0. These cases are not very interesting from the analysis point of view: if voter
i has a dominant strategy to abstain due to ci >
1
2
(violating constraint (39) for any
probability distribution that places a positive probability on profiles with i voting), her
presence in the list of players does not affect at all the outcome of the election, so we
can redefine N ≡ N \ {i}. A more elaborate way to handle this problem requires the
use of an asymmetric probability distribution, which would distinguish i from the other
players in her group and assign probability zero to all profiles with i voting. We do
not fully analyze this case, but we conjecture that allowing for high-cost voters will not
substantially change our results.
If voter i has a dominant strategy to vote due to ci < 0, then simply removing
this voter results in a loss of generality. The case of negative costs requires some special
handling, but it is tractable in our framework. First of all, without additional assumptions
about the distribution of such costs across groups, one can nevertheless argue that, under
the veil of ignorance, voters with negative costs are just as likely to belong to either of
the groups, so we would expect their votes to cancel each other out. Notwithstanding
this argument, we would like to consider the case of negative costs for some voters for the
following reasons. First, it suggests a turnout model that incorporates some additional
factors, like citizen duty, which may be important for some voters. Second, we need to
consider the negative costs to be able to directly compare our results with Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985), who in their Assumption 2 explicitly include them. It is important to
understand whether we get a high turnout equilibria due to our solution concept being
the correlated equilibrium, or due to a different assumption about the cost support.
Let L ⊂ N be the set of voters with (strictly) negative costs. We restrict the set of
admissible joint distributions to those that place probability zero on voters in L receiving
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a recommendation to abstain and probability one on voters in L receiving a recommen-
dation to vote. With this modification, we can replace the actual group sizes, nA and nB
with their modified versions, n˜A and n˜B, which take into account the voters from L so
that n˜A = nA−LA and n˜B = nB −LB. This is as if the actual group sizes are shifted by
a constant. It is clear that our results hold for the modified game.
4 Incomplete Information
Incomplete information in the voter turnout game was introduced by Ledyard (1981), and
further explored in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Under incomplete information, Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1985, Theorem 2) established that in the quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium only voters with non-positive voting costs will vote in the limit as nA, nB get
large. There are several ways to introduce the incomplete information into the basic
model, but not all of them are suitable for the analysis of high-turnout correlated equi-
libria. In this section we consider the simplest version.
In general, player i’s type is a pair (ti, ci) of her political type (candidate preference)
and the corresponding cost of voting. The political type directly affects the utilities of
all voters through the resulting split into majority and minority, but the voting cost type
only affects the utility of a specific player. In this section we assume, for simplicity, that
voters’ political types are common knowledge.17 We use t to denote the fixed commonly
known joint political type where each voter i has political type ti. The costs of voting
are stochastic: each voter i ∈ N , draws her private cost of voting, ci, from a commonly
known discrete18 distribution Fti with support {cti , . . . , c¯ti}, where 0 < cti ≤ 12 and
0 < c¯ti < 1. The assumption about the support range helps rule out uninteresting
equilibria, e.g. those with everyone voting for sure, or those with everyone abstaining
for sure. We assume ci is distributed independently of all other voters’ costs c−i (and
types t−i). Distributions FA and FB determine the set of admissible joint cost profiles,
characterized by the tuple of respective cost bounds (cA, c¯A, cB, c¯B) as
C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) ≡ {(ci)i∈N |cti ≤ ci ≤ c¯ti} (42)
17This is a strong assumption. There are ways of relaxing it (Myerson, 1998, 2000), but they are
inconsistent with the variant of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium we consider in this
paper. We conjecture that this assumption can be relaxed in a communication equilibrium (Myerson,
1986; Forges, 1986), and leave it for future research.
18Typically it is assumed in the literature that the cost distributions are absolutely continuous. We
do not make this assumption to avoid dealing with measurability issues in the definition of a strategic
form correlated equilibrium below. See Cotter (1991) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
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We write C−i(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) to refer to the set of admissible cost profiles for players other than
i. Denote pi(c) the probability of a joint cost profile c = ((ci)i∈N) ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B). The
independently distributed costs then imply that
pi(c) ≡
 ∏
{i∈N :ti=A}
FA(ci)
 ∏
{i∈N :ti=B}
FB(ci)

Since the political types are fixed by assumption, we omit the respective component
in the definition of players’ strategies and for each i ∈ N define a pure strategy si :
{cti , . . . , c¯ti} → {0, 1A, 1B} as a function that maps voter i’s cost into an action (abstain,
vote for candidate A, or vote for candidate B, respectively). We assume that voters never
vote for the candidate of the opposite political type, so we abuse notation and merge 1A
and 1B into 1 meaning the act of voting for the “correct” candidate. The set of all pure
strategies for player i ∈ N is a finite set Si = {0, 1}{cti ,...,c¯ti}, i.e. the set of all functions
from cost types into actions. Let S ≡ ×i∈NSi be the set of all joint strategies.
The utility of player i from a joint strategy s(c) ≡ (sj(cj)j∈N) when player i’s voting
cost is ci (and the joint political type is t) takes the following form:
ui(s(c)|ci) =

1− si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) >
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
1
2
− si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) =
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
−si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) <
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
Let us now discuss the solution concept. There are quite a few alternative definitions
of the correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information (see in particular
Forges (1993, 2006, 2009), Section 8.4 of Bergemann and Morris (2013) and Milchtaich
(2013)), which are often far from being equivalent. The sets of expected payoffs corre-
sponding to specific definitions are (sometimes) partially ordered by inclusion. We use the
strategic form incomplete information correlated equilibrium, as defined in Forges (1993,
2006). This is the strongest definition in the sense that it results in the smallest set
of expected payoffs compared, for example, to the communication equilibrium (Myerson
(1986), Forges (1986)). Hence if we can obtain a substantial turnout in the strategic form
correlated equilibrium, then we can also obtain it in any of the more general definitions
of the correlated equilibrium under incomplete information.
A Strategic Form Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium(SFIICE) is a prob-
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ability distribution q ∈ ∆(S) that selects a pure strategy profile s = (si)i∈N with prob-
ability q(s), such that when recommended si and knowing her type, no player has an
incentive to deviate, given that other players follow their recommendations. Formally,
q ∈ ∆(S) is a SFIICE if for all i ∈ N , all ci ∈ {cti , . . . , c¯ti}, all ai ∈ {0, 1}, and any
si ∈ Si such that si(ci) = ai, we have
∑
{
c−i∈C−i(cA,c¯A,cB,c¯B)
}pi(c)
∑
a−i
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i)
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] ≥ 0
for all a′i ∈ {0, 1}.
It will be convenient to explicitly rewrite these conditions as the set of distributions
q ∈ ∆(S) such that for all i ∈ N , all ci ∈ {cti , . . . , c¯ti}, and all si ∈ Si such that si(ci) = 0
we have
∑
c−i
pi(c)
ci ∑
a−i∈V iD
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0)

+
(
ci − 1
2
) ∑
a−i∈V iP
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0)
 ≥ 0 (43)
and for all si ∈ Si such that si(ci) = 1 we have
∑
c−i
pi(c)
−ci ∑
a−i∈V iD
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1)

+
(
1
2
− ci
) ∑
a−i∈V iP
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1)
 ≥ 0 (44)
where, as before, V iP and V
i
D are the set of joint action profiles such that player i is
pivotal and dummy, respectively, and the summation over the others’ costs is understood
to be over cost profiles in C−i(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B). The induced probability distribution over action
profiles at every cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) is given by
ν(a|c) ≡
∑
{s∈S|∀i∈N :si(ci)=ai}
q(s) (45)
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The max turnout problem under incomplete information now takes the following form:
g∗ ≡ max
q∈D(NA,NB ,FA,FB)
∑
{c∈C(cA,c¯A,cB,c¯B)}
pi(c)
 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
ν(a|c)
(∑
i∈N
ai
) (46)
Full characterization of the solution to this problem is not our goal in this section.
Rather, we just want to show a possibility result, that correlated equilibria with sub-
stantial turnout can survive in the incomplete information case. The next proposition
delivers the desired result.
Proposition 8. Suppose nA, nB ≥ 1 and nA > nB. Let FA, FB be any discrete distri-
butions over players’ voting costs, {cA, . . . , c¯A}, and {cB, . . . , c¯B}, respectively, such that
c¯B ≤ cA ∈ (0, 0.5), 0 < c¯A < 0.5, and 0 < cB < 0.5. Then g∗ ≥ h˜∗, where h˜∗ is defined
in (41).
Proof. See A.10.
This result holds for large electorates as well.19
5 Discussion
Since Nash equilibria are also correlated equilibria, it is important to understand what
exactly the analysis of correlated equilibria adds to the existing results in the literature.
Under complete information and common voting cost, our paper extends Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983), who characterized two classes of the Nash equilibria that exhibit sub-
stantial turnout and survive when the electorate becomes large.20 Palfrey and Rosenthal
call those mixed-pure strategy equilibria and symmetric totally-mixed strategy equilibria,
respectively. The former equilibria require all voters in one group mixing between voting
and abstention with some common probability, whereas voters in the other group are
further divided into two subgroups such that all voters in one subgroup vote for sure,
and all voters in the other subgroup abstain for sure. The latter equilibria require voters
in each group mixing with the same group-specific probability. Both of these equilibrium
classes have a counter-intuitive property: the expected turnout is increasing in cost. Fur-
thermore, symmetric totally-mixed equilibria only exist when the cost is large enough
19In particular, we mean the case where the ratio between group sizes remains fixed as their sizes
increase to ∞, with fixed cost supports.
20This latter criterion is important: Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) identify many other equilibria that
have nice properties, but do not survive in large electorates.
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and both groups have the same size. This unfortunate dependence on both groups hav-
ing exactly the same size translates directly into the incomplete information case, and,
in a sense, is the primary reason why no high-turnout equilibria survive even slightest
uncertainty in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) when the electorate size gets large. The
corresponding result in this paper (see Proposition 1) has neither of these shortcomings.
Under heterogeneous voting costs, we can compare our Proposition 7 with Taylor and
Yildirim (2010, Proposition 2). They find that under incomplete information, in large
electorates the limit expected turnout and the probability of winning are completely
determined by the lowest voting costs in each group. In contrast, the max turnout
correlated equilibrium puts a joint restriction both on the lowest voting cost in one
group and the highest voting cost in the other. This is the effect of two opposing incentive
compatibility constraints. In a quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in cutpoint
strategies, which is typically considered in the literature, the two constraints for each
group merge into one at the critical cost. Another related result is Kalandrakis (2007),
who proves that under complete information and heterogeneous costs almost all Nash
equilibria are regular, and there exists at least one monotone Nash equilibrium, where
players with higher costs participate with weakly lower probabilities. In our group-
symmetric max-turnout correlated equilibria a similar logic allows to restrict attention
to the lowest and highest costs in each group.
Under incomplete information, we extend Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Their high-
turnout equilibria do not survive uncertainty when the electorate size gets large. In
contrast, our high-turnout correlated equilibria persist under certain conditions on cost
supports (see Proposition 8). This result can be also compared with Kalandrakis (2009),
who basically shows that high turnout Nash equilibria of the complete information game
with a common positive cost can persist under incomplete information. Assuming that
densities of the private voting cost, private benefit, or both, converge to a point mass that
corresponds to a complete information turnout game with a positive common voting cost,
Kalandrakis (2009, Thm 4) permits introducing incomplete information with respect to
individual voting cost, the size of each candidate’s support, or both. The crucial difference
from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)’s negative result on high-turnout equilibria under
incomplete information is that Kalandrakis holds the size of the electorate fixed, and
varies the uncertainty level, while Palfrey and Rosenthal hold the uncertainty level fixed
and vary the total size of the electorate. A natural restriction on Kalandrakis’ results
comes from the fact that the Nash equilibria of the complete information game can be
approximated by Bayesian equilibria only for sufficiently small perturbations. Thus while
Kalandrakis (2009) established regularity of the class of asymmetric Nash equilibria which
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was typically dismissed in the literature due to lack of tractability, he does not resolve
the turnout paradox. Our results, in a sense, provide a link between those two papers.
We show in Proposition 8 that group-symmetric max-turnout correlated equilibria can
be preserved under incomplete information about voting costs, while correlation allows
to maintain high-turnout for large electorates, as long as cost supports are fixed.
One potential criticism of our model concerns the idea of maximizing the expected
total turnout without separate considerations for turnout in each group of supporters. It
is not clear a priori whether the our model can be consistent with the models of the group-
based ethical voter approach, if we assume that both groups independently maximize the
turnout among their own members. However, our results in Proposition 1 show that
when the minority is large, the same level of maximal expected total turnout can be
achieved when groups maximize their members’ turnout independently. We relegate more
general analysis to a companion paper (Pogorelskiy, 2015), which explicitly addresses
coordination among groups in a new equilibrium concept.
6 Concluding remarks
This is the first paper to introduce and characterize the set of correlated equilibria in the
voter turnout games. The solution concept of the correlated equilibrium, developed by
Aumann (1974, 1987), allows us to explicitly take into account the possibilities of pre-play
communication between voters. Communication expands the set of equilibrium outcomes
in turnout games thereby providing a micro foundation for group-based mobilization, as
well as a solution to the turnout paradox that does not require ad hoc assumptions about
voters’ utility.
We analyzed the correlated equilibrium turnout in three main settings, varying the
information structure (complete and incomplete) and the assumptions on agents’ voting
costs (homogenous and heterogeneous).
Under complete information and homogenous voting cost, we fully characterized the
turnout bounds in terms of the correlated equilibria that maximize and minimize the
expected turnout. These bounds provide a theoretical constraint on the levels of turnout
that can be achieved if there are no restrictions on pre-play communication, and also
characterize the range of expected turnout implementable in a correlated equilibrium.
The set of correlated equilibria includes all equilibria arising under any of the more
restricted communication protocols, e.g., voter communication in networks.
We found that there are two classes of the max turnout correlated equilibria, deter-
mined by the relative sizes of the two competing groups. If the minority is at least half
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the size of the majority, the resulting expected turnout is twice the size of the minority
and does not depend on the cost. If the minority is less than half the size of the majority,
the resulting expected turnout is a decreasing function of the voting cost that starts at
the size of the majority for low costs and goes down to twice the size of the minority
for high costs. We also characterized the equilibrium distribution support and several
key election statistics (probabilities of a tie and of the majority winning). In contrast to
the high-turnout Nash equilibria, the high-turnout correlated equilibria possess intuitive
properties. For example, the majority group is more likely to win for all costs, and the
tie probability is increasing in the cost. We also characterize the correlated equilibria
that maximize social welfare. Those are generally different from the minimal turnout
equilibria, but exhibit a similar range of expected turnout.
We then showed that the high-turnout equilibria under complete information and
homogenous voting cost have analogues under heterogenous costs, which may also remain
feasible correlated equilibria under incomplete information about voting costs (assuming
certain additional conditions about the cost support).
Our results emphasize the important role of communication in turnout games. A nat-
ural question remains: why is the correlated equilibrium a reasonable solution concept?
How, exactly, the correlated equilibria we describe in this paper can be implemented?
The answer to the first question is given by Aumann (1987) and Hart and Mas-Colell
(2000). Correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as an “expression of Bayesian ratio-
nality”: if it is common knowledge that every player maximizes expected utility given
her (subjective) beliefs about the state of the world, the resulting strategy choices form a
correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, correlated equilibrium can be obtained as a result
of a simple dynamic procedure driven by players’ regret over past period observations.
The answer to the second question typically invokes describing a direct mechanism
where an impartial mediator, such as a leader, gives recommendations to players. How-
ever it is important to realize that a correlated equilibrium can be also implemented
without the mediator, as a Nash (or even sequential) equilibrium of the expanded game
with simple communication.21 Laboratory experiments are a useful tool for understand-
ing the effects of unmediated communication on turnout in a controlled setting. Else-
where (Palfrey and Pogorelskiy, 2014) we show that these effects are nuanced: with a low
voting cost, party-restricted communication increases turnout, while public communica-
tion decreases turnout; while with a high voting cost, public communication increases
turnout. From a theoretical perspective, establishing a realistic communication scheme
21See Forges (1990), Gerardi (2004), and Gerardi and Myerson (2007).
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that is “minimally necessary” for implementing high-turnout correlated equilibria re-
mains a promising extension that we leave for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix any i ∈ NA and consider two voting profiles: x1 := (0i, a, b) and x2 :=
(1i, a − 1, b) such that the total number of votes in group NA is a, the total number
of votes in group NB is b, and in the first profile voter i abstains, while in the second
profile i turns out to vote and somebody else from NA abstains. We will construct
the equivalent symmetric distribution iteratively. At step 1, we let σ∗1(s) = µ
∗(s) for
all profiles s 6= x1, x2. The objective in either (9) or (10) does not depend on voters’
identities, only on the total number of votes in each profile. Since the total number of
votes at either x1 or x2 is the same and equals a+ b, it does not matter for the objective
how σ∗1 distributes the probability mass among x1 and x2 compared to µ
∗ as long as
µ∗(x1)+µ∗(x2) = σ∗1(x1)+σ
∗
1(x2). Hence we can let σ
∗
1(x1) = σ
∗
1(x2) =
1
2
(µ∗(x1)+µ∗(x2)).
Clearly, this argument holds for any a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, any b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}, and
any i ∈ NA, and a similar argument holds for any k ∈ NB and profiles (0k, a, b) and
(1k, a, b − 1), respectively. We can now iteratively construct σ∗, where at each step
t ≥ 2 we define xt1 and xt2 by one of the remaining combinations of (a, b, i), and let
σ∗t (s) = σ
∗
t−1(s) for all profiles s 6= xt1, xt2. Once we have considered all combinations, we
obtain σ∗, for which by construction f(σ∗) = f(µ∗) and σ∗ ∈ M. It remains to show
that all IC constraints are satisfied at σ∗. To see this, let’s roll back to σ∗1 and show that
the IC constraints are satisfied at each iteration. Notice that the sets V iD and V
i
P in (8)
and (7) do not depend on other voters’ identities, but only on the total number of votes
on each side of the profile, hence x1 ∈ V iP if and only if x2 ∈ V `P for any ` ∈ NA, ` 6= i
such that ` votes at x1 and abstains at x2 (since a ∈ {1, . . . , nA− 1}, there must exist at
least one such player). Similarly, x2 ∈ V iP if and only if x1 ∈ V `P for any such `. These
relations hold for all (x1, x2) with a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, and any b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}. By
assumption, IC constraints (5)-(6) hold for all i ∈ N under µ∗. Since the voting cost is
the same for everyone in NA, and µ
∗ is optimal, the corresponding IC constraints must
be of the same kind (slack or binding) for both i and ` under µ∗, and, moreover, they
must put the same restriction on the total probability that i is pivotal at x1 as they put
on the total probability that ` is pivotal at x2, i.e.∑
s−i∈V iP
|s−i|=a+b
µ∗(0i, 1`, s−i∪`) =
∑
s−`∈V `P
|s−`|=a+b
µ∗(0`, 1i, s−i∪`)
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and ∑
s−i∈V iP
|s−i|=a−1+b
µ∗(1i, 0`, s−i∪`) =
∑
s−`∈V `P
|s−`|=a−1+b
µ∗(1`, 0i, s−i∪`)
But then redistributing this probability mass symmetrically under σ∗ does not violate
the IC for i ∈ NA, a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, and any b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}. Similarly, we can prove
that this redistribution does not violate the IC for k ∈ NB and b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, a ∈
{0, . . . , nA}.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the fact that all profile probabilities sum up to one and µ0,0 = 0 at the
optimum, rewrite the objective in (34) as
1 +
∑
{s|∑ si=2}
µ(s) + 2
∑
{s|∑ si=3}
µ(s) + . . .
+(n− 2)
∑
{s|∑ si=n−1}
µ(s) + (n− 1)µ(1, . . . , 1) (47)
Since
∑
s µ(s) = 1, the above expression is maximized if the largest possible probability
is placed on the outcomes with more turnout.22 In particular, the maximal possible value
of n is achieved when µ(1, . . . , 1) = 1.
Since nA > nB, the full turnout profile, (1, . . . , 1) is in VA. By Lemma 1, it is
sufficient to consider symmetric distributions. To simplify the notation, we denote the
probability of any profile with a, b total votes for A,B, respectively, by µa,b ≡ µ(#A =
a,#B = b), without further reference to an individual player. We are going to use these
(nA + 1)(nB + 1) probabilities as our decision variables. When we distinguish between
individual voters among those in the profile (a, b), however, there are going to be
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
different profiles (each having the same probability µa,b in the symmetric distribution).
Hence the total probability constraint is now written as
nA∑
a=0
nB∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b = 1 (48)
One may wonder how the symmetric distribution can be implemented. In the me-
diator setup, we can think of it in the following way: a mediator picks a voting profile
(a, b) with probability
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b, and then randomly recruits the respective number
22Indeed, each consecutive term in the expanded sum has a greater marginal effect on the value of the
objective than the previous term.
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of voters on each side. These voters receive a recommendation to vote. The remaining
voters receive a recommendation to abstain.
Using the symmetry, we can rewrite constraints (5)-(6) for players in NA (NB, re-
spectively) as the following system of four inequalities with respect to (nA + 1)(nB + 1)
variables of the form µa,b:
nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(49)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
(50)
and
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(51)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
(52)
We will refer to the first and the third inequality above as the odd incentive compatibility
(IC) constraints, and to the second and the fourth inequality as the even IC constraints,
distinguished by the group.
Since we assumed nA > nB, at the largest turnout profile µ(1, . . . , 1) ≡ µnA,nB voters
from NB (as well as voters from NA, if nA > nB + 1) are dummies. This implies that
the even IC constraint for NB is always binding at the optimum. As for the even IC
constraint for NA, we can show that for nA > nB ≥ d12nAe it is always slack. To see this,
41
notice that the even IC for NA requires
µnA,nB ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b −
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
+
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (53)
The binding even IC for NB requires
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnB+1,b
−
nB∑
b=2
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µ0,b (54)
Comparing the right hand sides of these two expressions, we see that in every single
term of (53), except for the two terms on the last line, the total profile turnout matches
exactly the total profile turnout in the corresponding term of (54). There are three
possibilities. If the RHS of (54) is strictly less than the RHS of (53), the even IC for
NA is slack, so we are done. The RHS of (54) cannot be strictly greater, since then the
even IC for NA does not hold at all, and so we are not at the optimum of the constrained
maximization program. The critical case is when the two RHS are the same; but this
holds at the optimum if and only if the sum of the last two terms of (53) is zero (otherwise,
since the profiles in the last two terms of (53) are not matched in (54), and so are not
restricted by (54), the RHS of (53) in the optimum can be increased without increasing
the RHS of (54), which is optimal when nB ≥ d12nAe).
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As long as nB ≥ d12nAe, we have 2nB ≥ nA and 2nB + 1 > nA, so
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 > 0
That is, the sum of the two terms on the last line of (53) is strictly positive at the
optimum. This follows, since the total turnout of the first term, 2nB + 1, exceeds the
total turnout of the largest term in the above sum, which is nA, achieved at µnA,0.
Therefore, the RHS of (54) is strictly less at the optimum than the RHS of (53) and so
the even IC for NA is slack, given that the even IC for NB is binding. Now, if nB < d12nAe,
then 2nB + 1 ≤ nA, so it is easy to see that the even IC constraints for both groups are
binding at the optimum.
As for the odd IC constraints, we can show that the situation is the opposite: the odd
IC for NA is always binding at the optimum, while the odd IC for NB only binds when
nB > d12nAe (for even nA) or nB ≥ d12nAe (for odd nA). To see this, notice that in the
binding constraint (54) all profiles such that a non-voter from NA is a dummy have the
negative sign, so we want to reduce them as much as possible in the optimum. The only
subset of profiles where a non-voter from NA is a dummy which is not directly restricted
by (54) has the form
∑nA−1
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)
µa,0. But these profiles are restricted by (53). If the
latter is binding, the restriction is trivial. Suppose not, then if we reduced all directly
restricted by (54) probabilities to their lower limit of zero and the odd IC for NA still was
not binding, then constraint (53) (slack by assumption) would imply that µnA,nB < 0.
Therefore, the odd IC for NA must bind at the optimum.
Let us now turn to the odd IC constraint for NB. The odd IC for NA is binding as
we just demonstrated, so we can rewrite (49) and (51), respectively, as
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(55)
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and
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(56)
Comparing these two expressions, we see that, except for the terms on the first two
lines of (55) and those on the first line of (56), in every remaining profile of (55) the
total turnout matches exactly the total turnout in the corresponding term of (56).
Suppose nB < d12nAe, then 2nB < nA. We want to show that at the optimum
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b +
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB >
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB (57)
The case of nA − 1 < nB + 1 is not possible, since then nA = nB + 1, but 2nB < nA
implies nB < 1. So nA − 1 ≥ nB + 1, then nA ≥ nB + 2. Notice that on the RHS of
(57) (at profiles with probability µa,nB in the first sum) the total turnout in each profile
equals nB + nA − k, where k ≥ 1, matching the corresponding turnout in each profile on
the LHS of (57) (at profiles with probability µnA,b) as long as nA − k ≥ nB + 1 (since
a ≥ nB + 1 in the first sum). Once nA − k = nB + 1, there are no more profiles left
in the first sum of the RHS of (57), but there remain profiles with probability µnA,b in
the corresponding sum on the LHS of (57) as long as 0 ≤ nB − k ≤ nB − 1, since we
have 0 ≤ b ≤ nB − 1. Writing the largest possible k∗ = nA − nB − 1, we see that since
nA ≥ nB + 2 by assumption, we indeed have k∗ ≥ 1. Therefore, the LHS of (57) contains
the profiles with larger turnout that are unmatched by the profiles on the RHS of (57):
at the very least, the corresponding probabilities are µnA,0 and µnA,1. So at the optimum
(57) holds; hence, the odd IC for NB is slack.
Now if nA is even, we can extend this result to the case where nB = d12nAe, since
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then 2nB = nA, so even though µnA,1 becomes matched by the first probability in the
sum on the RHS, µnB+1,nB , we still have µnA,0 unmatched on the LHS. However, if nA
is odd, then nB = d12nAe implies 2nB = nA + 1, so µnA,0 becomes matched by µnB ,nB−1,
and hence the odd IC for NB is binding at the optimum.
Finally, if nB > d12nAe, then 2nB ≥ nA + 1, so all profiles on the LHS of (57) are
matched by the corresponding profiles on the RHS, so the odd IC for NB is binding.
Table 1 summarizes our findings on binding and slack constraints in the maximization
problem. To finish the proof, we need to consider three cases, corresponding to the
Table 1: IC constraints at the optimum (max-turnout equilibria)
nB < d 12nAe nB = d 12nAe nB > d 12nAe
Odd IC for NA (49) always binds
Even IC for NA (50) binds slack slack
Odd IC for NB (51) slack slack for even nA; binds
binds for odd nA
Even IC for NB (52) always binds
Note: nA > nB, 0 < c <
1
2
columns of Table 1.
First, suppose nB > d12nAe. Then the odd IC constraint for NA binding implies
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b −
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
+
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
= 0, (58)
the odd IC constraint for NB binding implies
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nA∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b −
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a
+
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
= 0, (59)
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and the even IC constraint for NB binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
(60)
At the optimum, µnA,nB must be as large as possible. This implies that the terms in
the first parentheses must be as large as possible, and in particular, the last term in
the second sum,
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB , since it has the largest turnout among the terms with the
positive sign. Now, from the odd IC for NA,(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
· µnB−1,nB =
c
1
2 − c
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(61)
Substituting, re-arranging and simplifying the terms (notice that µ0,0 = 0 by optimality),
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (62)
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The binding odd IC for NB allows us to express µnA,nB−1 as
µnA,nB−1 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
−
(
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
)
Plugging in µnA,nB−1 into the expression for µnA,nB above, we obtain
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)(
(a− nB)(2nA − nB + 1) + a
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,a
+
(nA + 1)(2− 12c)− nB
nA − nB + 1
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
+
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)− 12−cc (nB − a)(nA − nB + 1) + nA(nB − a)− (nB + a)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
µa+1,a
+
(
c(nA − 1)−
(
1
2 − c
)
(nA − nB + 1)
c(nA − nB + 1)
)
nAµ1,0 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
2nA − nB + 1− a
nA − nB + 1 µa,0 +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB
b
)(
nB − 2b
nB
)
µnA,b
+
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − 2nB + 1)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b (63)
It is important to determine the signs of all the terms in the above expression. It is
easy to see that the first term (the largest tied profile) is positive, the next one negative.
The terms with µa,a, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1}, are negative, as well as the terms with µa,a+1, a ∈
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{0, . . . , nB − 2}.23 The terms with µa+1,a, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, are negative too.24 The
term with µ1,0 can be positive depending on the cost (but has the lowest possible total
turnout). The remaining terms on the same line are positive. All terms on the next
three lines (terms with µa,b for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 3}, b ∈ {a + 2, . . . , nB − 1}; a ∈ {nB +
2, . . . , nA−1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1}; and a ∈ {3, . . . , nB}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a−2}) are positive.25
The terms with µa,0, a ∈ {2, . . . , nA − 1} are all positive. The last term on the same line
(with µnA,b) is positive for b ∈ [0, bnB2 c] and negative for b ∈ [bnB2 c+1, nB−2]. The terms
on the last line (terms with µnB+1,b, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}) are all positive, since even for
b = nB − 1, the numerator is positive.
We can now start optimizing by setting µa,b = 0 for all negative terms with total
turnout smaller than nB + nB. That is, in (63) we set
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (64)
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} (65)
µa+1,a = 0, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (66)
Given the slack even IC for NA at the optimum when nB > d12nAe (see Table 1), we
23To see this, note that for 0 < c < 0.25 we have 2 − 1/2c negative, which is sufficient. When
0.25 < c < 0.5, the difference 2− 1/2c is positive, but since nB < nA + 1,
(nA + 1)
(
2− 1
2c
)
− nB < nB
(
2− 1
2c
)
− nB = nB
(
1− 1
2c
)
< 0.
24This follows, since the numerator of the expression in the parentheses multiplied by µa+1,a can be
rewritten as (
1− 1
2c
)
(nB − a)(nA − nB + 1)− (nA + 1)(nB − a− 1) < 0.
25The case when b ≥ a + 2 is obvious. The next one (a ∈ {nB + 2, . . . , nA − 1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1})
follows from observing that already at a = nA − 1, b = 1, the numerator is
(nB − 1)(2nA − nB + 1) + (1− nA)nB = nB(nA − nB + 3)− nA − (nA + 1)
> nB(nA − nB + 3)− 2nB − nA > nB(nA − nB + 3)− 4nB + 1
= nB(nA − nB − 1) + 1 > 0.
The terms for a ∈ {3, . . . , nB}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a−2} are all positive, since even if we take the largest a = nB ,
the numerator is positive: (nB − b)(2(nA − nB) + 1) − nB > 0 ⇔ b < nB − nB2(nA−nB)+1 , which always
holds.
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must have
µnA,nB <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
+
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
]
(67)
Using (64)-(66), we obtain
µnA,nB <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
µ1,0 −
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
(
nA − 1
nB − 2
)
µnB−1,nB +
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
+
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
]
(68)
Replacing the LHS of this expression with (63) and re-arranging, we obtain
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nA(nA − 1)
nA − nB + 1µ1,0 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
nB − 1
nA − nB + 1µa,nB
+
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)(
2nA − nB + 1− a
nA − nB + 1 +
a
nA
)
µa,0 +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB
b
)
2(nB − b)
nB
µnA,b
+
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − 2nB + 1)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
nB + 1
nA
)
µnB+1,b <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
nB − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(nA + 1)µ1,0 +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
a+ 1− nB
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
−
[(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnA,nB−1 +
(
nA − 1
nB − 2
)
µnB−1,nB
]
(69)
Notice that all terms to the left of the inequality sign are positive and enter (63) with
positive signs. The terms to the right of the inequality sign are all positive except the
last parenthesis. Since those terms in the parentheses are not restricted by (63) (due
to our constraint substitution), we optimally set them equal to zero. In addition we set
µ1,0 = 0 since this allows to increase the remaining terms on the RHS that have larger
turnout.
Taking into account the signs of the terms in (63), and given (69), we see that the RHS
of (63) is optimized whenever we increase the RHS of (69). Therefore, in the optimum
the sum of the terms on the LHS of (69) is as small as possible. It cannot be zero, though,
due to the binding odd IC constraint for NA (58). Indeed, this constraint determines
the maximal allowed increase to µnB ,nB via the sum of
∑nA−1
a=nB+1
µa,nB and
∑nB−2
a=0 µa,nB
(taken with appropriate coefficients).
Hence in the optimum, the support of the equilibrium distribution only includes the
profiles of the form (a, nB) for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB−2}∪{nB, . . . , nA}. Therefore, the optimal
probability of the largest profile is
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µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB (70)
The only remaining constraint is that the total sum of probabilities is one, which,
given (70), can be written as
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB = 1
Rewriting,
nA
nA − nB + 1
(
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
)
+
1
2c + nA − nB
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1
Using the binding odd IC constraint for NA, (58), we obtain
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 0
Substituting into the previous expression, we obtain
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) (71)
Hence
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB =
(1− 2c)(nA − nB)
nA
(72)
Plugging-in these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
(47) as
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f∗ = 1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
+(nB + nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA + nB − 1)µnA,nB
= 1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
+(nB + nB − 1)2c+ nA + nB − 1
nA − nB + 1
[
1− 2c+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
(nB − a− 1)µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
(nB − a− 1)µa,nB
]
= 1 + (2nB − 1)2c+ (1− 2c)(nA + nB − 1)
nA − nB + 1 +
2(nB − 1)nA
nA − nB + 1
[
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
]
= 4cnB + (1− 2c)
[
1 +
nA + nB − 1
nA − nB + 1 +
2(nB − 1)nA(nA − nB)
(nA − nB + 1)nA
]
= 4cnB + 2(1− 2c)nB nA − nB + 1
nA − nB + 1 = 2nB
So, the maximal expected turnout is twice the size of the minority.
This completes the proof of case (i), with the exception of the knife-edge case of
nB = d12nAe. We address this case after finishing the proof of case (ii).
Now suppose nB < d12nAe. Then 2nB < nA. Due to the odd IC for NA and even IC
for NB binding, we can express the probability of the largest profile as
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µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (73)
On the other hand, the even IC for NA binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
−
nA∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (74)
Comparing these two expressions and taking into account that the odd IC for NB is
53
slack, we see that at the optimum,
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (75)
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (76)
µnB+1,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (77)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {nB + 2, . . . , nA − 1}, b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} (78)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {3, . . . , nB + 1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a− 2} (79)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}, b ∈ {a+ 2, . . . , nB} (80)
Given (75)-(80), we can rewrite (74) as
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b −
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 − µnA,0 (81)
We also rewrite (73) as
µnA,nB =
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa+1,a −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b
+
(
1
2 − c
)
nA
cnB(nA − nB + 1)
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
nA
nA − nB + 1
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 (82)
Now (81) and (82) imply that in the optimum
µnA,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (83)
In addition, the slack odd IC for NB, given (75)-(80), takes the form
µnA,0 +
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
µa,0 >
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (84)
Together with 2nB ≤ nA−1, this implies that at the optimum µa,0 = 0, a ∈ [2, nB+1],
and hence the support of the distribution includes only the profiles of the form (a +
1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (nB, nB) and (nA, 0). In particular, µnA,nB = 0, since from (84) and
(81), µnA,0 offsets µnB+1,nB and µnB ,nB (from the maximization point of view, the profiles
with higher turnout must receive larger probability weights).
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Hence we can rewrite (81) as
µnA,nB = 0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
− µnA,0 (85)
The probability constraint now can be written as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 1
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c − 1)
nA
)
µa+1,a
+
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)(
nA
nB
+
1
2c
− 1
)
µnB ,nB = 1 (86)
From (82),
0 =
(
nA
nB
) 1
2c − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB
+
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa+1,a (87)
Thus
µnB ,nB = −
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a (88)
Now we can rewrite (86) as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c − 1)
nA
−
(
nA
nB
+
1
2c
− 1
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA(
1
2c − 1)
)]
= 1 (89)
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Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)− nB(nA − 1) + a(nA + 1)
nA
−nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB
(
1
2c − 1
) ] = 1 (90)
In addition, the binding odd IC for NA implies
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
(
nB − a− nB
nA
)
= 0 (91)
The binding even IC for NB is implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a =
1
2
− c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB (92)
Using these expressions together with (86) and (88), we can (after some tedious algebra)
express
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) (
1 +
(
1
2c − 1
) (
1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)) (93)
Now, from (85),
µnA,0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
=
1
2 − c
c
[(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
1
nA − 1 +
nB
nA
)
+
(
nA
nB
)
nB
nA
µnB ,nB
]
=
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
1
2c
(
1
nA − 1 +
nB
nA
)
− 1
nA − 1
]
=
2c
nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA
(
1
2c
− 1
)[
1
nA − 1
(
1
2c
− 1
)
+
1
2c
nB
nA
]
(94)
Plugging-in these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
(47) as
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f∗ = 1 +
nB∑
a=0
2a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA − 1)µnA,0
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
2a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
−(2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a
+(nA − 1)
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
−
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
) (
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a)
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
+(nA − 2nB + 2nB − 1)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (nA − 2nB + 2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
+(2nB − 1)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
+(nA − 2nB)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (nA − 2nB)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 1 + 2nB − 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− 2nB + 1
+(nA − 2nB)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)− nB(nA − 1) + a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
)(
1− µnA,0 −
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
)
×
 nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA
− 2c ( 12c − 1) [ 1nA−1 ( 12c − 1)+ 12c nBnA ]− 2c
nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA

= 2nB +
(nA − 2nB)(1− 2c)
1 + 2c
(
nA(nA−1)
nA+nB(nA−1) − 1
)
= 2nB + φ(c)
= nA × 2cnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c)57
This completes the proof of case (ii).
Finally, there remains the knife-edge case of nB = d12nAe. When nA is odd, the odd
IC for NB is binding, so the proof of case (i) given above works just the same, giving the
maximal expected turnout of 2nB. When nA is even, the odd IC for NB is slack, so the
proof of case (ii) directly applies. The value of the objective function at the optimum has
φ(c) = 0. However, in contrast to case (ii), the support of the symmetric distribution is
different and in fact, may include all profiles except the tied ones with turnout less than
nB, and the profiles of the form (a, a + 1), a ∈ [0, nB − 1]. There is no simple analytic
expression available for the equilibrium support, so we verified our conclusions for this
case using computer simulations.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. Case (ii). In this case, the only profile in the support where the majority can lose
is (nB, nB), so
pim = 1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1−
c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
Case (i). Since in the equilibrium distribution support all the profiles where the majority
wins are of the form (a, nB) for a ∈ [nB + 1, nA] plus the largest tied profile, it is easy to
see that
pim =
1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB + µnA,nB (95)
The first term above equals c from (71), but we do not have enough constraints to
identify the remaining terms in the sum individually. The rest of the proof characterizes
the bounds on these terms producing the result in the statement.
As Table 1 shows, at the optimum there are three binding constraints plus the total
sum of probabilities constraint. It turns out that the first binding constraint, (58),
becomes equation (72), which we repeat here for convenience:
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB = (1− 2c)
(
1− nB
nA
)
(96)
The second binding constraint, (59), becomes an identity as it does not contain any
profiles from the equilibrium support. The third binding constraint, (60), reduces to the
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total probability constraint. Namely,
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB = 1 (97)
From (71), 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = c. Hence from the total probability constraint, 1−pim−c ≥
0 and the first inequality in the statement follows.
The two binding constraints we are left with, (96) and (97), are not enough to deter-
mine pim even knowing µnB ,nB .
26 Nevertheless, from (96) and (97) we can express
µnA,nB =
nB
nA
(1− 2c)−
nB−2∑
a=0
a
nA
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB −
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
a
nA
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
Note that at the optimum µnA,nB > 0. We want to show that pim > 0.5 for all c ∈ (0, 0.5).
Suppose by way of contradiction that pim ≤ 0.5 for some cost c in this range. Then from
(95)
µnA,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB ≤
1
2
(1− 2c)
Correspondingly, from (97)
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB ≥
1
2
(1− 2c)
This implies that the total probability mass is greater on the lower turnout profiles than
on the higher turnout ones. Denote T the expected turnout at the optimal probability
distribution. From Proposition 1, T = 2nB. Then
2nB =
nB−2∑
a=0
(a+ nB)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB + 2c · 2nB +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(a+ nB)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
= (1− 2c)
(
1
2
+ ε
)
µ¯L + 2c · 2nB + (1− 2c)
(
1
2
− ε
)
µ¯H ,
where µ¯L is the mean expected turnout at the lower turnout profiles, µ¯L ∈ (0, 2nB − 2);
µ¯H is the mean expected turnout at the higher turnout profiles, µ¯H ∈ (2nB +1, nA+nB),
26For the special case identified in Remark 3, there are just two profiles in the equilibrium support
other than (nB , nB): (0, nB) and (nA, nB), hence we can derive their probabilities using (96) and (97).
We obtain µ0,nB = (1− 2c)
(
1− nBnA
)
, and therefore pim =
nB
nA
+ c
(
1− 2nBnA
)
.
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and ε ∈ [0, 0.5) is such that pim = 12 − ε. But then
2nB = (1− 2c)
[(
1
2
+ ε
)
(µ¯L + µ¯H)− 2εµ¯H
]
+ 2c · 2nB < 2nB,
since due to 2nB > nA and turnout maximization,
(
1
2
+ ε
)
(µ¯L + µ¯H) − 2εµ¯H < 2nB.
Contradiction, so pim >
1
2
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The results follow by taking the limits of the expressions for the maximal expected
turnout obtained in Proposition 1, divided by n ≡ nA + nB. To make sure the proof of
Proposition 1 works in the first place, notice that the incentive compatibility constraints
(49)-(52) are well-behaved for all n and bounded.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The minimum case is different, because the smallest (and so potentially optimal)
profile (0, 0) ∈ VT for all nA, nB ≥ 1. Nevertheless, the symmetric distribution construc-
tion derived in the proof of Proposition 1 can be applied here just as well. Notice first
that µ0,0 ≥ 0 at the optimum. Using the latter and the fact that all profile probabilities
sum up to one, rewrite the objective in (35) as
1− µ0,0 +
∑
{s|∑ si=2}
µ(s) + 2
∑
{s|∑ si=3}
µ(s) + . . .
+(n− 2)
∑
{s|∑ si=n−1}
µ(s) + (n− 1)µnA,nB (98)
To minimize this expression, we want to increase µ0,0 as much as possible and set all
remaining probabilities to their lowest possible level. Notice that profiles (0, 1) and (1, 0)
are not directly present in (98), and profiles with total turnout of exactly two have the
same (absolute) marginal effect on the objective as µ0,0.
The odd ICs for NA and NB, (49) and (51), respectively, restrict µ0,0 from above
27,
and the exact bound depends on the ratio
1
2
−c
c
. This ratio approaches zero when the cost
increases towards 0.5, so for large enough cost, minimization requires placing the largest
probability mass onto (0, 0) at the expense of other voting profiles (in particular, with
total turnout of three or more), and so the minimal expected turnout approaches zero.
27If nA = nB , the right hand sides of the ICs for NA in (49) and (51) must be a bit adjusted to have
the indices in the first summation go up to nB − 1 instead of nB .
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The opposite happens when the cost is close to 0, because then
1
2
−c
c
→ ∞, and hence
(49) and (51) both require their right hand sides being close to zero. Since nA ≥ nB,
this is achieved by setting µa,a = 0 for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1}. The probability of the
largest tied profile, µnB ,nB , can be positive at the optimum for c close to zero, because
1
2
−c
c
(
nA−1
nB−1
)
µnB ,nB restricts µ2,0 from above in the even IC for NA, (50), and
1
2
−c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
restricts µ0,2 from above in the even IC for NB, (52), whereas for nA = nB, µnB ,nB is
not at all restricted by the odd IC constraints (see ft.27), and for nA > nB, µnB ,nB
is only restricted by the odd IC for NA. But in all cases, the value of the objective
does not exceed 2: it is always optimal to shift the largest possible probability mass
onto the profiles with total turnout between 0 to 2, so even when c is close to 0, the
(possible) presence of non-zero terms with turnout exceeding 2 is compensated by their
small equilibrium probabilities. The analytic expression for the missing cost-dependent
part of the expected turnout, ψ(c), can be now straightforwardly, though rather tediously
(due to the equilibrium distribution support depending on the cost) derived using the
same approach we applied in the proof of Proposition 1. For c close to 0, all IC constraints
are binding, while for c close to 0.5, all but the even IC for NB bind.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Any t ∈ [f∗(c), f ∗(c)] can be written as a linear combination of f∗(c) and f ∗(c):
t = λf∗(c) + (1 − λ)f ∗(c) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since f∗(c), f ∗(c) are expected turnouts
in a min-turnout and max-turnout correlated equilibria, and the set of CE payoffs is
convex, t is also an expected turnout in some correlated equilibrium given by probability
distribution λµ∗ + (1− λ)µ∗.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose there is a correlated equilibrium with majority
winning for sure. Then a profile (0, 0) is not in equilibrium support. The only way the
IC constraint for voters in NB can be satisfied with a positive voting cost is to restrict
the total probability mass to only those profiles where no one from NB ever votes.
28 This
leaves admissible only profiles with voters from NA voting. Denote ν(1i, a − 1, b) the
equilibrium probability of a joint profile where i ∈ NA votes and there are a − 1 other
players from NA voting and b players from NB voting.
29 The IC constraint for voter i
28Strictly speaking, in this case the conditional probability that a voting player from NB is pivotal is
not well-defined, so the corresponding IC constraint is vacuously satisfied.
29This is a shorthand notation, which should be understood as a sum of probabilities of all joint
profiles where i is voting and all remaining players behave as described.
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from NA (see (6)) takes the following form:
nA∑
a=2
ν(1i, a− 1, 0) ≤
1
2
− c
c
ν(1i, 0, 0)
At the same time, the IC constraint for any non-voter from NB (see (5)) can be written
as
nA∑
a=2
∑
i∈NA
ν(1i, a− 1, 0) ≥
1
2
− c
c
∑
i∈NA
ν(1i, 0, 0)
Clearly, both constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Hence there is no correlated
equilibrium with majority winning for sure.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Welfare maximizing correlated equilibria have Pr(Majority wins) as large as possi-
ble and expected turnout as small as possible, so profiles of the form (a+1, a), a ∈ [0, nB]
must be in the support. The IC for non-voters in NB is now binding at the optimum and
implies (
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB − 1
1
)
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
c
[
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
]
, (99)
hence the equilibrium profiles must also include either (2, 0), or (0, 1), or both. Note
though that at (0, 1) majority loses, so including this profile decreases the probability
that majority wins as well as expected welfare. It is also important that in (99) the
probability of tied profiles restricts the probability mass distributed among the welfare-
optimal profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB − 1], so there can be at most one tied profile in the
equilibrium: (nB, nB).
The odd IC constraint for NA implies
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
2
)
µ2,0 ≥
1
2 − c
c
[(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1
]
This constraint is always slack at the optimum since it does not restrict the total proba-
bility of the welfare-maximizing profiles on the left hand side.
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The even IC constraint for NA implies(
nA − 1
1
)
µ2,0 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
(100)
and is binding at the optimum due to (99). Finally, the even IC constraint for NB implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
µ0,1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
(101)
This constraint can be satisfied if either (0, 1) or (nB, nB) are in the support
30, in which
case the constraint is binding as long as some of the profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are in
the support. If neither (0, 1) nor (nB, nB) is in the support, the constraint requires all
profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] not to be in the support as well.
Rewriting (99), we obtain
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB − 1
1
)
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (102)
From (100),
(nA − 1)µ2,0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
(103)
so we can rewrite (102) as
1
2 − c
c
[
nB−1∑
a=0
[(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
−
(
nA
2
)
nA − 1
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)]
µa+1,a
]
=
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
2
)
nA − 1
((
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
+ (nB − 1)µ0,1
or
1
2 − c
2c
nAµ1,0 +
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
1− a
(
1 +
2
nB
))
µa+1,a =
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
nB
)
nB
2
µnB ,nB + (nB − 1)µ0,1 (104)
Notice that all terms in the sum on the first line are negative if profiles (a+1, a), a ∈ [1, nB]
are in the support.
30It is not optimal to include both profiles in the support, because then there is simultaneously a
decrease in the probability majority wins and an increase in the expected turnout.
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The total probability constraint takes the following form:
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1
Plugging in the expression for µ2,0 from (103), we obtain
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(12 − c)(a+ 1)
2c
]
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c
+ 1
]
+ nBµ0,1 = 1 (105)
Using the total probability constraint, the total welfare minus the fixed nB term can
be written as follows
W − nB = (nA − nB)
[
1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB − nBµ0,1
]
−c
[
nB∑
a=0
(2a+ 1)
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + 2
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 + 2nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + nBµ0,1
]
Suppose all profiles (a + 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are in the support, then IC constraint (101) is
binding:
nB∑
a=0
a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a =
1
2 − c
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
(106)
Thus we can rewrite the above expression for welfare as
W − nB = (nA − nB)
[
1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB − nBµ0,1
]
−c
[
2(12 − c)
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
+ 1 +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
]
Simplifying, this equals
= nA − nB − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]− c
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0
Plugging in the expression for µ2,0, we obtain
nA − nB − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
− nB(
1
2 − c)
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]
−
1
2 − c
2
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
(a+ 1)µa+1,a
)
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After tedious algebraic manipulations with the binding IC constraints, we can express
the sum of all (a+ 1, a) profile probabilities as follows.
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a = µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)

+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c

Using this expression together with (106) to substitute the respective terms in the
formula for welfare, we obtain
W = nA − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
− nB(
1
2 − c)
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]
−c
µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)
+ (nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c

−
1
2 − c
2
1
2 − c
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
Simplifying, we can finally write
W ∗ = nA − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB + 2nB(
1
2 − c)
2
−
(
1
2 − c
)2
(1 + nB)
c
]
+
µ0,1
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]−
(
1
2 − c
)2
(1 + nB)
c
]
(107)
From the binding IC constraints we obtain
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a = µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)

+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
(
1
2 − c
)
nB
2c

We can now write down the total probability constraint as follows
c+ 12
1
2 − c
µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)
+ (nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
(
1
2 − c
)
nB
2c

+
(
1
2 − c
)2
2c2
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c
+ 1
]
+ nBµ0,1 = 1
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Simplifying,
µ0,1
[
nB − (c+ 12)
1
2 − c
+
(c+ 12(nB + 1))(
1
2 − c)
c2
]
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
(c+ 12(nB + 1))(
1
2 − c)
c2
+
nB
2c
+ 1
]
= 1
We can now estimate the effects of including either (0, 1) or (nB, nB) in the equilibrium
support on welfare. First, let µ0,1 = 0, then(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB =
1
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
(108)
Plugging in to (107), we obtain
W ∗nB ,nB = nA − c+
[
c− nA+nB+2nB(
1
2
−c)
2 −
( 12−c)
2
(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
(109)
Second, let µnB ,nB = 0, then
µ0,1 =
1[
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
] (110)
Plugging in to (107), we obtain
W ∗0,1 = nA − c+
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
(111)
Comparing W0,1 and WnB ,nB , we see that (nB, nB) is in the support iff[
c− nA+nB+2nB(
1
2
−c)
2 −
( 12−c)
2
(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
>
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
which is equivalent to
2c
[
2c− cnA − nB + 1
2
]
>
(12 − c)c(nB + 1)
[
cnB [nB − nA] + c− nB+14
]
c2(32nB − 1)− c2nB+14 + nB+18
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It is straightforward to check that the denominator on the RHS is always positive for
nB ≥ 1 and c ∈ (0, 0.5), so we can rewrite
(
2c2(2− nA)− c(nB + 1)
)(
c2(
3
2
nB − 1)− c2nB + 1
4
+
nB + 1
8
)
>
(
c
2
− c2)(nB + 1)
[
cnB [nB − nA] + c− nB + 1
4
]
This expression reduces to the following quadratic inequality:
c2(2− nA)(3nB − 2)− c
[
(nB + 1)(nB
(
3
2
+ nA − nB
)
− nA) + nA − 2
2
]
+
(nB + 1)(nB − nA)(12 − nB)
2
> 0 (112)
The discriminant of (112) is
D ≡ (nB + 1)2
(
nB
(
3
2
+ nA − nB
)
− nA
)2
+
(nA − 2)2
4
+ (nA − 2)(nB + 1)
[nB
2
+ (nA − nB)(1 + 6nB(nB − 1))
]
,
which is always positive for nA > 2 ≥ nB ≥ 1, so the cutoff cost is uniquely31 determined
by
c∗ = min
{
0.5,
(nB + 1)(nB(
3
2 + nA − nB)− nA) + nA−22 −
√
D
2(2− nA)(3nB − 2)
}
(113)
Hence for 0 < c < c∗ profile (nB, nB) is in the equilibrium support, and the optimal
welfare is given by (109). For c∗ < c < 0.5, profile (nB, nB) is not in the equilibrium
support, but profile (0, 1) is, and the optimal welfare is given by (111). These expressions
were derived under the assumption that profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are in equilibrium
support. To conclude the proof, we need to consider the case where the cost is so high
that these profiles are not in the support, and constraint (101) is slack. In this case, of
course, (nB, nB) is not in the equilibrium support.
Suppose that profiles (a + 1, a), a ∈ {1, . . . , nB} are not in the equilibrium support.
Then from (104),
1
2 − c
c
µ1,0 =
2(nB − 1)
nA
µ0,1
31The other critical cost value is always negative, so outside the range of (0, 0.5).
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Using the total probability constraint, we can now write(
nA
1
)
µ1,0 +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1 = 1
or
µ0,1
2(nB − 1)
1
2
−c
c
+ 2nB − 1
 = 1
So we obtain
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)
µ1,0 =
2c(nB − 1)
nA
[
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)]
µ2,0 =
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)(
nA
2
) [
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)]
and the optimal welfare is
W ∗ =
nB(nB − c)(12 − c) + 2c(nB − 1)(nA − c) + (nA − 2c)
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)
nB −
(
1
2 + c
) (114)
We can now compare W ∗ with W ∗0,1 to obtain the condition on the cost for which
(a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are not in the support: this is so iff
nA − c+
(12 − c)c2
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
c2(nB − (c+ 12)) + (c+ 12(nB + 1))(12 − c)2
<
nB(nB − c)(12 − c) + 2c(nB − 1)(nA − c) + (nA − 2c)
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)
which is equivalent to the following cubic inequality:
c3
(
nA +
nB − 5
2
)
+
c2
2
((nA − nB)(nB − 1) + 3− nB)
− c
4
(
nB + 1
2
+ (nA − nB)(2nB + 1)
)
+
(nA − nB)(nB + 1)
8
< 0
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 1. Assume that the optimal
correlated equilibrium distribution is symmetric, as defined there. Although the voting
costs are heterogenous, it is easy to see that once constraints (38) hold for the players with
the lowest cost in each group, and constraints (39) hold for the players with the highest
cost, the incentive compatibility constraints for all players will hold automatically.
Using symmetry, we obtain the following system of four inequalities with respect to
(nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the form µa,b:
nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− cA
cA
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(115)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
(116)
and
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− cB
cB
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(117)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
(118)
We will refer to the first and the third inequality above as the odd incentive compatibility
(IC) constraints, and to the second and the fourth inequality as the even IC constraints,
distinguished by the group.
Since nA > nB, at the largest turnout profile µnA,nB all voters from NB (as well as
voters from NA, if nA > nB + 1) are dummies. Hence the even IC constraint for NB is
always binding at the optimum.
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The even IC constraint for NA requires
µnA,nB ≤
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b −
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
+
1
2c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (119)
The binding even IC for NB requires
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnB+1,b
−
nB∑
b=2
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µ0,b (120)
These expressions immediately imply that the odd IC for NA is always binding at the
optimum. To see this, notice that in the binding constraint (120) all profiles relevant
for the odd IC for NA, i.e. those where a non-voter from NA is a dummy, have the
negative sign and so must be reduced as much as possible at the optimum. The only
subset of profiles where a non-voter from NA is a dummy that is not directly restricted
by (120) has the form
∑nA−1
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)
µa,0. But these profiles are restricted by (119). If the
latter is binding, the restriction is trivial. Suppose not, then if we reduced all directly
restricted by (120) probabilities to their lower limit of zero and the odd IC for NA was still
not binding, then constraint (119) (slack by assumption) would imply that µnA,nB < 0.
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Therefore, the odd IC for NA must bind at the optimum, so we can write it as
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − cA
cA
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b =
1
2 − cA
cA
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(121)
Thus for all cost thresholds the even IC for NB and the odd IC for NA are binding.
Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can express µnA,nB from (120)
(the binding even IC for NB) and then substitute the term
(
nA−1
nB−1
)
µnB−1,nB using (121)
(the binding odd IC for NA). The resulting expressions are the modified versions of (60),
(61), and (62), respectively:
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
, (122)
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
· µnB−1,nB =
cA
1
2 − cA
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
, (123)
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and
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
a(nA + 1)− nBnA
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
+
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
cA(
1
2 − cA
) nA
nA − nB + 1
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
(124)
The key difference between (124) and (62) is that in (124), all terms in the last square
brackets have an additional multiplier
1
2
−c¯B
c¯B
cA
( 12−cA)
. The equivalence between (124) and
(62) holds if and only if this multiplier equals 1, that is, if and only if cA = c¯B. If these
cost thresholds are different, the equilibrium probability of the largest profile, as well
as other profiles in the equilibrium support, will be different than in either of the cases
considered in Proposition 1, and therefore, the corresponding maximal expected turnout
will be different from f ∗, the maximal expected turnout in Proposition 1. How much
different depends on the relation between cA and c¯B. Suppose that cA < c¯B. Then a
simple contradiction argument implies
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
cA(
1
2
− cA
) < 1 (125)
In this case, maximization implies placing a smaller probability mass on the largest
turnout profile than in Proposition 1.32 Therefore, the expected turnout is lower than in
Proposition 1 for all costs satisfying this condition. It is easy to show that if cA > c¯B, the
opposite inequality holds in (125) and the equilibrium distribution places a larger mass
on µnA,nB , so the expected turnout is higher than in Proposition 1.
We will now show that if cA = c¯B, the equilibrium distribution support does not
change, and the maximal expected turnout corresponds to f ∗ from Proposition 1.33
32Note that this is true even if µnA,nB = 0 at the optimum, because in this case decreasing the RHS
of (124) means smaller probability of the next largest profile in the equilibrium support.
33This is exactly so for case (i), where the expected turnout does not depend on the cost. For case(ii),
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The remaining IC constraints, the even IC for NA and the odd IC for NB, generally
exhibit more complicated bind/slack properties. Unlike the homogenous cost case, their
behavior at the optimum depends on the relations between the cost thresholds. We
claim, however, that if cA = c¯B = c, the IC constraints exhibit the same behavior as in
Proposition 1: for nB > d12nAe the even IC for NA is slack for all admissible values of
c and the remaining cost thresholds, c¯A and cB, and the odd IC for NB is binding. For
nB < d12nAe the even IC for NA is binding, and the odd IC for NB is slack.
Let nB > d12nAe. Comparing (120) and (119), we see that the RHS of (120) cannot
be strictly greater than the RHS of (119), since if this was the case, the even IC for NA
would not hold at all at the optimum of the constrained maximization program. If the
RHS of (120) is strictly less than the RHS of (119), then the even IC for NA is slack,
as we claim. The critical case is when the two RHS are the same. Since by assumption
nB > d12nAe, we have 2nB ≥ nA + 1, so 2nB + 1 > nA. Then the total turnout of the
first term on the last line of (119), 2nB + 1, exceeds the total turnout of the largest term
in the remaining summation on that line, which is nA, achieved at µnA,0. Hence at the
optimum
1
2c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 > 0
Since cA = c¯B = c, a simple contradiction argument implies that
1
2
− c¯A
c¯A
≤
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
(126)
At the same time,
1
2
−c¯A
c¯A
< 1
2c¯A
, and the largest turnout in the parentheses on the first
line of (119), 2nB, is less than 2nB + 1, the turnout of the term with coefficient
1
2c¯A
on
the last line of (119). Optimization implies that the effect of this latter term must exceed
the effect of the former. Therefore at the optimum the RHS of (120) is strictly less than
the RHS of (119), and so the even IC for NA is slack.
which is cost dependent, we will show that the expected turnout exhibits the same cost-dependent
dynamics as in Proposition 1.
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Turning to the odd IC constraints, we can rewrite (117) as
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2 − cB
cB
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(127)
Comparing (127) with (121), we again see that, except for the terms on the first two
lines of (121) and those on the first line of (127), in every remaining profile of (121)
the total turnout matches exactly the total turnout in the corresponding term of (127).
Since cA = c¯B, we have
1
2
− cA
cA
≤
1
2
− cB
cB
(128)
Then at the optimum
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b +
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB ≤
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB (129)
This follows, since nB > d12nAe, so 2nB ≥ nA + 1 and all profiles on the LHS of (129)
are matched by the corresponding profiles on the RHS. Together with (128), this implies
that the odd IC for NB is binding.
We can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1. One can even show
that the expression for the probability of the largest tie remains the same:
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) , (130)
where c = cA = c¯B. Substituting the expressions for the probabilities of the largest
profiles into the objective function, we obtain h∗ = 2nB. This completes the proof of
case (i).
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Now suppose nB < d12nAe, then 2nB < nA. Analogously to case (ii) of Proposition
1, we have the even IC for NA binding and the odd IC for NB slack at the optimum, if
cA = c¯B = c. Due to the odd IC for NA and the even IC for NB binding
34, we can express
the probability of the largest profile as
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (131)
On the other hand, the even IC for NA binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
−
nA∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (132)
Comparing (132) with (131), taking into account that c¯A ≥ c and the odd IC for NB
34These constraints bind for case (i) just as well.
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is slack, we see that at the optimum, just like in case (ii) of Proposition 1,
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (133)
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (134)
µnB+1,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (135)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {nB + 2, . . . , nA − 1}, b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} (136)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {3, . . . , nB + 1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a− 2} (137)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}, b ∈ {a+ 2, . . . , nB} (138)
Given (133)-(138), we can rewrite (132) as
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b −
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 − µnA,0 (139)
We also rewrite (131) as
µnA,nB =
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa+1,a
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
(
1
2 − c
)
nA
cnB(nA − nB + 1)
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 (140)
Now (139) and (140) imply that at the optimum
µnA,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (141)
In addition, the slack odd IC for NB, given (133)-(138), takes the form
µnA,0 +
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
µa,0 >
1
2 − cB
cB
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (142)
Together with 2nB ≤ nA − 1, this implies that at the optimum µa,0 = 0, a ∈
{2, . . . , nB + 1}, and hence the support of the distribution includes only the profiles
of the form (a + 1, a), a ∈ {0, . . . , nB}, (nB, nB) and (nA, 0). In particular, µnA,nB = 0,
since from (142) and (139), µnA,0 offsets µnB+1,nB and µnB ,nB (from the maximization
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point of view, the profiles with higher turnout must receive larger probability weights).
Hence we can rewrite (139) as
µnA,nB = 0 =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
− µnA,0 (143)
The probability constraint can now be written as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 1
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c¯A
− 1)
nA
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)(
nA
nB
+
1
2c¯A
− 1
)
µnB ,nB = 1(144)
From (140),
0 =
(
nA
nB
) 1
2c − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa+1,a(145)
Thus
µnB ,nB = −
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a (146)
Now we can rewrite (144) as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c¯A
− 1)
nA
−
(
nA
nB
+
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA(
1
2c − 1)
)]
= 1 (147)
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(a+ 1)( 12c¯A − 1)
nA
− [nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)][2c¯A(nA − nB) + nB]
nAnB c¯A
(
1
c − 2
) ] = 1 (148)
In addition, the binding odd IC for NA implies
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nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
(
nB − a− nB
nA
)
= 0 (149)
The binding even IC for NB is implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a =
1
2
− c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB (150)
Using these expressions together with (144) and (146), we can (after some algebra) express
µnB ,nB =
2(
nA
nB
) (
1
c
[
1 + 12c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1c¯A(nA−1)
) (151)
It is interesting to compare this expression with its analogue (93) in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. Notice that the two coincide if c = c¯A. From (143),
µnA,0 =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
=
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
[(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
nA(nA − 1) +
(
nA
nB
)
nB
nA
µnB ,nB
]
=
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
1
nA
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
nA − 1 + nB
]
=
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c(
nB(nA−1)
nA
+ 1)− 1
)
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(nA−1)
nA
+ 1
)
− 1
)
+ nA
1
2c − 1
(152)
Plugging-in these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
the analogue of (47) for the case of heterogeneous costs as
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h∗ = 1 + 2
nB∑
a=0
a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA − 1)µnA,0
= 1 + 2nB
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+ (nA − 1)
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)
nA
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
+ nB(nA − 1)
nA − 1
= 1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB
c
− 1 +
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(1− 1
nA
) + 1
)
− 1
)]
= 1 +
2
[
nB
c − 1 +
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(1− 1nA ) + 1
)
− 1
)]
1
c
[
1 + 12c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1c¯A(nA−1)
= nA × 2c¯AnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c¯A[nA − nB](nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c, c¯A)
Finally, a simple proof by contradiction shows that 2nB < h
∗ < nA for all costs 0 < c ≤
c¯A <
1
2
. This completes the proof of case (ii).
A.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Set q to be a probability distribution in ∆(S) that chooses the cost-independent
strategies (i.e., constant functions from types to actions) with probability 1. This allows
us to write si(ci) = si for all ci ∈ (0, 0.5). Require in addition that for all i ∈ N , all
a−i ∈ V iD, and all a−i ∈ V iP∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0) = µ(0, a−i)
and ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1) = µ(1, a−i),
where µ(a) ∈ ∆(S) is the probability distribution over joint action profiles that delivers
the solution to the max turnout problem under complete information with heterogeneous
costs defined by C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) (see Proposition 7). Notice that for cost-independent strate-
gies, the summations on the LHS of the above expressions are taken over a single strategy.
Then for every player i, q selects the constant-zero strategy si(ci) = 0 ∀ci ∈ (0, 0.5) with
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probability
∑
a−i µ(0, a−i), and the constant-one strategy si(ci) = 1 ∀ci ∈ (0, 0.5) with
the complementary probability. Suppose first that c¯B = cA. Then Proposition 7 holds
at any cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) with the same equilibrium distribution over actions,
µ(a) ∈ ∆(S), because this distribution is completely determined by the cost bounds
(cA, c¯A, cB, c¯B) and the sizes of the groups, nA and nB. Therefore, none of the incentive
compatibility constraints (38)-(39) is violated at an arbitrary c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B). Hence
this is true for all admissible c, and both constraints (43)-(44) hold as well. Therefore, we
can guarantee the expected turnout at least as large as h˜∗. If c¯B < cA, then, as discussed
in the proof of Proposition 7, the maximum expected turnout exceeds h˜∗, so again, for
any fixed cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) we can satisfy conditions (38)-(39) with the same
equilibrium distribution µ(a) ∈ ∆(S).
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